THE NEW ZOOnotic REVIEW: Tracking Diseases Shared Between Humans and Animals and Tracing Their Use as Biological Weapons, Past, Present and Future
Thursday, September 30, 2010
Wednesday, September 29, 2010
Deathcount Rises from 2 to 10 / Suspect CCHF
UNDIAGNOSED FATAL ILLNESS - PAKISTAN (02): (KHYBER-PAKHTUNKHWA)
***************************************************************
A ProMED-mail post
ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases
Date: Tue 28 Sep 2010
Source: Express Tribune [edited]
10 die of mysterious disease in Dir
-----------------------------------
A total of 10 people have died of an unknown disease in Lower Dir
while another 15 have been shifted to a hospital with the same
symptoms. According to locals, the disease broke out around 15 days
ago, with symptoms of severe temperature and body ache which resulted
in death within 2 weeks. Doctors say the symptoms of the disease are
similar to dengue [fever]. The blood samples of the affected persons
have been sent to the National Institute of Health in Islamabad; 3
critically ill patients have been shifted to Khyber Teaching Hospital,
Peshawar, where they are being kept in an isolation ward.
One [suspected] dengue patient was diagnosed with the Crimean-Congo
hemorrhagic fever (CCHF) virus infection in Karachi, causing alarm in
the city.
--
Communicated by:
ProMED-mail Rapporteur Mary Marshall
[The description of the symptoms of the illness responsible for the 10
fatalities and 15 hospitalised cases in Lower Dir is not sufficient to
suggest a diagnosis. Dengue fever appears to have been excluded, but
CCHF virus infection remains a possibility. It is unclear at present
if there is any similarity between this outbreak and the deaths of
patients at the Ayub Hospital Abbottabad, also in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa
(see the preceding ProMED-mail report, archive number 20100927.3505).
Further information would be welcomed.
Dir is a town in Upper Dir District, Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province
(formerly North-West Frontier Province), Pakistan. It lies at the foot
of the Lowarai Pass, the main motor road to Chitral, on the Dir River,
a tributary of the Panjkora River. The HealthMap/ProMED-mail
interactive map of Pakistan can be accessed at:
. - Mod.CP]
[see also:
Undiagnosed fatal illness - Pakistan: (NW) 20100927.3505
Crimean-Congo hem. fever - Pakistan (03): (PB) 20100923.3440
Crimean-Congo hem. fever - Pakistan (02): (KI) 20100917.3372
Crimean-Congo hem. fever - Pakistan ex Afghanistan: RFI 20100629.2161]
...................cp/ejp/jw
*##########################################################*
************************************************************
ProMED-mail makes every effort to verify the reports that
are posted, but the accuracy and completeness of the
information, and of any statements or opinions based
thereon, are not guaranteed. The reader assumes all risks in
using information posted or archived by ProMED-mail. ISID
and its associated service providers shall not be held
responsible for errors or omissions or held liable for any
damages incurred as a result of use or reliance upon posted
or archived material.
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.
***************************************************************
A ProMED-mail post
ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases
Date: Tue 28 Sep 2010
Source: Express Tribune [edited]
10 die of mysterious disease in Dir
-----------------------------------
A total of 10 people have died of an unknown disease in Lower Dir
while another 15 have been shifted to a hospital with the same
symptoms. According to locals, the disease broke out around 15 days
ago, with symptoms of severe temperature and body ache which resulted
in death within 2 weeks. Doctors say the symptoms of the disease are
similar to dengue [fever]. The blood samples of the affected persons
have been sent to the National Institute of Health in Islamabad; 3
critically ill patients have been shifted to Khyber Teaching Hospital,
Peshawar, where they are being kept in an isolation ward.
One [suspected] dengue patient was diagnosed with the Crimean-Congo
hemorrhagic fever (CCHF) virus infection in Karachi, causing alarm in
the city.
--
Communicated by:
ProMED-mail Rapporteur Mary Marshall
[The description of the symptoms of the illness responsible for the 10
fatalities and 15 hospitalised cases in Lower Dir is not sufficient to
suggest a diagnosis. Dengue fever appears to have been excluded, but
CCHF virus infection remains a possibility. It is unclear at present
if there is any similarity between this outbreak and the deaths of
patients at the Ayub Hospital Abbottabad, also in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa
(see the preceding ProMED-mail report, archive number 20100927.3505).
Further information would be welcomed.
Dir is a town in Upper Dir District, Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province
(formerly North-West Frontier Province), Pakistan. It lies at the foot
of the Lowarai Pass, the main motor road to Chitral, on the Dir River,
a tributary of the Panjkora River. The HealthMap/ProMED-mail
interactive map of Pakistan can be accessed at:
[see also:
Undiagnosed fatal illness - Pakistan: (NW) 20100927.3505
Crimean-Congo hem. fever - Pakistan (03): (PB) 20100923.3440
Crimean-Congo hem. fever - Pakistan (02): (KI) 20100917.3372
Crimean-Congo hem. fever - Pakistan ex Afghanistan: RFI 20100629.2161]
...................cp/ejp/jw
*##########################################################*
************************************************************
ProMED-mail makes every effort to verify the reports that
are posted, but the accuracy and completeness of the
information, and of any statements or opinions based
thereon, are not guaranteed. The reader assumes all risks in
using information posted or archived by ProMED-mail. ISID
and its associated service providers shall not be held
responsible for errors or omissions or held liable for any
damages incurred as a result of use or reliance upon posted
or archived material.
************************************************************
Donate to ProMED-mail. Details available at:
************************************************************
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For assistance from a human being, send mail to:
Tuesday, September 28, 2010
UNDIAGNOSED FATAL ILLNESS - PAKISTAN: (KHYBER-PAKHTUNKHWA)
Symptoms similar to Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever, a known biological weapon; http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/intro/bio_congo-att.htm
*********************************************************
A ProMED-mail post
ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases
Date: Mon 27 Sep 2010
Source: PakTribune [edited]
2 people -- a young doctor and a Chinese engineer -- have died from a
mysterious disease, while a schoolboy was stated to be in a critical
condition at the Ayub Teaching Hospital (ATH) for the last one week,
official sources said.
The sources in the health department revealed that [these] patients
brought to the ATH from the flood-affected areas showed a decrease in
their blood clotting ability. The sources said the patients initially
suffered fever and headache followed by fits, and later their blood
platelets decreased.
The sudden death of a young resident medical officer, Dr H., caused by
the mysterious viral infection, has raised concern among the senior
doctors as well as the administration of the ATH. Deputy Medical
Superintendent of the Casualty Department of the ATH, Dr Junaid
Sarwar, told this [reporter] that Dr H. contracted fever in Bisham.
Later, investigation revealed that his platelet count dropped to the
range of 135 000 compared to the normal range of 150 000 to 300 000.
His fever was finally controlled on Sunday [19 Sep 2010], and he
rejoined the office. But on Tuesday [21 Sep 2010], he [collapsed] in
the washroom of the college hostel. He was rushed to the hospital's
emergency unit.
Another medical officer said that the ailing doctor's blood pressure
at that time was as low as 80/30, and emergency treatment was provided
to him. "Dr H. was conscious but suffering from severe headache at
that time. He fell unconscious after a few minutes and developed
regular fits," he recalled.
Medical specialists were immediately called; who recommended an MRI,
which diagnosed brain haemorrhage. The young doctor later died.
The younger brother of Dr H. has been showing the same symptoms for
the past few days. In a similar case, a Chinese engineer working in
Allai in Battagram district remained hospitalised at the Ayub Teaching
Hospital for a couple of days and later expired.
--
Communicated by:
ProMED-mail
[The Ayub Teaching Hospital or ATH is a public sector, non-profit
tertiary level teaching hospital in Abbottabad, Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa
(previously the North-West Frontier Province), Pakistan. Established
in 1998, it has one of the largest 24-hour emergency centers in
Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and caters to much of eastern Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa,
the Northern Areas of Pakistan, as well as certain parts of Azad
Kashmir ().
The signs and symptoms exhibited by the deceased doctor were similar
to those of Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever, and a hospital such as
the Ayub Hospital might be expected to make such a diagnosis rapidly
and take immediate steps to avoid nosocomial infection. It is not
stated whether the deceased doctor, his brother and the deceased
Chinese engineer had any contact with infected livestock or with each
other. Clarification and further information is awaited.
The HealthMap/ProMED-mail interactive map of Pakistan can be accessed
at:. - Mod.CP]
[see also:
Crimean-Congo hem. fever - Pakistan (03): (PB) 20100923.3440
Crimean-Congo hem. fever - Pakistan (02): (KI) 20100917.3372
Crimean-Congo hem. fever - Pakistan ex Afghanistan: RFI 20100629.2161]
.............................................mpp/cp/msp/jw
*##########################################################*
************************************************************
ProMED-mail makes every effort to verify the reports that
are posted, but the accuracy and completeness of the
information, and of any statements or opinions based
thereon, are not guaranteed. The reader assumes all risks in
using information posted or archived by ProMED-mail. ISID
and its associated service providers shall not be held
responsible for errors or omissions or held liable for any
damages incurred as a result of use or reliance upon posted
or archived material.
************************************************************
Donate to ProMED-mail. Details available at:
************************************************************
Visit ProMED-mail's web site at.
Send all items for posting to: promed@promedmail.org (NOT to
an individual moderator). If you do not give your full name
name and affiliation, it may not be posted. You may unsub-
scribe at.
For assistance from a human being, send mail to:
.
############################################################
############################################################
*********************************************************
A ProMED-mail post
ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases
Date: Mon 27 Sep 2010
Source: PakTribune [edited]
2 people -- a young doctor and a Chinese engineer -- have died from a
mysterious disease, while a schoolboy was stated to be in a critical
condition at the Ayub Teaching Hospital (ATH) for the last one week,
official sources said.
The sources in the health department revealed that [these] patients
brought to the ATH from the flood-affected areas showed a decrease in
their blood clotting ability. The sources said the patients initially
suffered fever and headache followed by fits, and later their blood
platelets decreased.
The sudden death of a young resident medical officer, Dr H., caused by
the mysterious viral infection, has raised concern among the senior
doctors as well as the administration of the ATH. Deputy Medical
Superintendent of the Casualty Department of the ATH, Dr Junaid
Sarwar, told this [reporter] that Dr H. contracted fever in Bisham.
Later, investigation revealed that his platelet count dropped to the
range of 135 000 compared to the normal range of 150 000 to 300 000.
His fever was finally controlled on Sunday [19 Sep 2010], and he
rejoined the office. But on Tuesday [21 Sep 2010], he [collapsed] in
the washroom of the college hostel. He was rushed to the hospital's
emergency unit.
Another medical officer said that the ailing doctor's blood pressure
at that time was as low as 80/30, and emergency treatment was provided
to him. "Dr H. was conscious but suffering from severe headache at
that time. He fell unconscious after a few minutes and developed
regular fits," he recalled.
Medical specialists were immediately called; who recommended an MRI,
which diagnosed brain haemorrhage. The young doctor later died.
The younger brother of Dr H. has been showing the same symptoms for
the past few days. In a similar case, a Chinese engineer working in
Allai in Battagram district remained hospitalised at the Ayub Teaching
Hospital for a couple of days and later expired.
--
Communicated by:
ProMED-mail
[The Ayub Teaching Hospital or ATH is a public sector, non-profit
tertiary level teaching hospital in Abbottabad, Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa
(previously the North-West Frontier Province), Pakistan. Established
in 1998, it has one of the largest 24-hour emergency centers in
Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and caters to much of eastern Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa,
the Northern Areas of Pakistan, as well as certain parts of Azad
Kashmir (
The signs and symptoms exhibited by the deceased doctor were similar
to those of Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever, and a hospital such as
the Ayub Hospital might be expected to make such a diagnosis rapidly
and take immediate steps to avoid nosocomial infection. It is not
stated whether the deceased doctor, his brother and the deceased
Chinese engineer had any contact with infected livestock or with each
other. Clarification and further information is awaited.
The HealthMap/ProMED-mail interactive map of Pakistan can be accessed
at:
[see also:
Crimean-Congo hem. fever - Pakistan (03): (PB) 20100923.3440
Crimean-Congo hem. fever - Pakistan (02): (KI) 20100917.3372
Crimean-Congo hem. fever - Pakistan ex Afghanistan: RFI 20100629.2161]
.............................................mpp/cp/msp/jw
*##########################################################*
************************************************************
ProMED-mail makes every effort to verify the reports that
are posted, but the accuracy and completeness of the
information, and of any statements or opinions based
thereon, are not guaranteed. The reader assumes all risks in
using information posted or archived by ProMED-mail. ISID
and its associated service providers shall not be held
responsible for errors or omissions or held liable for any
damages incurred as a result of use or reliance upon posted
or archived material.
************************************************************
Donate to ProMED-mail. Details available at:
************************************************************
Visit ProMED-mail's web site at
Send all items for posting to: promed@promedmail.org (NOT to
an individual moderator). If you do not give your full name
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scribe at
For assistance from a human being, send mail to:
############################################################
############################################################
Monday, September 27, 2010
HANTAVIRUS UPDATE 2010 - AMERICAS (33): CHILE (CENTRAL)
What is it? Open the link below to learn more about it and to see where the US was playing with this virus for use as a biological weapon) -
http://www.news-medical.net/health/What-is-Hantavirus.aspx
HANTAVIRUS UPDATE 2010 - AMERICAS (33): CHILE (CENTRAL)
*******************************************************
A ProMED-mail post
ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases
Date: Sun 26 Sep 2010
Source: La Tercera, Chile [in Spanish, trans. Mod.TY, edited]
Cases of [hantavirus infection] 40 percent higher than in 2009
--------------------------------------------------------------
After 4 years during which it seemed that hanta [virus infections]
were controlled, based on the low number of cases, today the
situation has again become relevant [to public health]. To date,
there are 49 people infected with the disease [virus], "a figure
greater than what is expected for this period," according to the
Ministry of Health (MINSAL) epidemiological report. Of these, 17 died.
Given this, the authorities issued an alert to the assistance
network, "During the next months an expected seasonal increase will
begin for this disease. Because of this, the health teams must be
alert for early indications," the document stated.
The chief of Epidemiological Surveillance of MINSAL, Maritza Garcia,
explained that although the numbers are still lower than those
registered in an epidemic year (in 2001 there were 81 cases),
mortality is high and represents 35 percent of infections. This
increase [in the number of cases of hantavirus infection] is due to
an increase in the rodent population that transmits the disease
[virus] (the long-tailed pygmy rice rat [_Oligoryzomys
longicaudatus_]). "If this is a year of more rain, if the quila
plants [a perennial bamboo that grows in the humid temperate forests
of Chile and Argentina] are flowering more or if there is greater
availability of grain, on which the rodents feed, the disease spreads more.
She also added that when the disease [incidence] decreases, people
tend to relax their preventive measures, which also affects [the risk
of] infection.
The regions where the most cases have occurred are Biobio (14
[cases]) and Maule (9). In that respect, the Biobio health SEREMI
[Regional Ministerial Secretariat] epidemiologist, Cecilia Soto, said
that 93 percent of the infected individuals are males. "The
environmental conditions are by far an important factor, such as
firewood collection." Osvaldo Palma, of the Maule health SEREMI,
said, on the other hand, that despite "the earthquake, where many
families decided to remain living in their destroyed houses, this
year [2010] we have not had a substantial increase in cases."
[Byline: Ana Maria Morales]
--
Communicated by:
ProMED-ESP
[Cases of infection by a hantavirus continue and are increasing in
this region of central Chile. Although not stated, the hantavirus
involved in this and previous cases doubtless is Andes virus.
An image of the long-tailed pygmy rice rat (_Oligoryzomys
longicaudatus_), the sigmodontine rodent host of Andes hantavirus,
can be seen at.
A map of Chile showing the administrative divisions including Biobio
and Maule regions can be seen at.
A HealthMap/ProMED-mail interactive map of Chile can be accessed at
. - Mod.TY]
[see also:
Hantavirus update 2010 - Americas (27): Chile (OH) 20100701.2198
Hantavirus update 2010 - Americas (24): Chile, USA, susp 20100509.1509
Hantavirus update 2010 - Americas (23): Chile (BI) 20100506.1476
Hantavirus update 2010 - Americas (21): Chile, Argentina 20100427.1357
Hantavirus update 2010 - Americas (20): Chile (AR) 20100422.1305
Hantavirus update 2010 - Americas (19): Chile (LL) 20100422.1297
Hantavirus update 2010 - Americas (18): Chile (ML) 20100420.1285
Hantavirus update 2010 - Americas (16): Argentina, Chile 20100407.1125
Hantavirus update 2010 - Americas (15): Chile, Bolivia 20100402.1050
Hantavirus update 2010 - Americas (14): Chile (AI, LG) 20100329.0990
Hantavirus update 2010 - Americas (13): Chile 20100322.0915
Hantavirus update 2010 - Americas (07): Chile 20100215.0534
Hantavirus update 2010 - Americas (06): Chile 20100213.0515
Hantavirus update 2010 - Americas (05): Chile, conf. 20100210.0467
Hantavirus update 2010 - Americas (04): Chile, susp., RFI 20100209.0448
Hantavirus update 2010 - Americas (02): Chile 20100119.0210
Hantavirus update 2010 - Americas (01): Chile 20100108.0097]
...................................ty/mj/mpp
*##########################################################*
************************************************************
ProMED-mail makes every effort to verify the reports that
are posted, but the accuracy and completeness of the
information, and of any statements or opinions based
thereon, are not guaranteed. The reader assumes all risks in
using information posted or archived by ProMED-mail. ISID
and its associated service providers shall not be held
responsible for errors or omissions or held liable for any
damages incurred as a result of use or reliance upon posted
or archived material.
************************************************************
Donate to ProMED-mail. Details available at:
************************************************************
Visit ProMED-mail's web site at.
Send all items for posting to: promed@promedmail.org (NOT to
an individual moderator). If you do not give your full name
name and affiliation, it may not be posted. You may unsub-
scribe at.
For assistance from a human being, send mail to:
.
############################################################
############################################################
http://www.news-medical.net/health/What-is-Hantavirus.aspx
HANTAVIRUS UPDATE 2010 - AMERICAS (33): CHILE (CENTRAL)
*******************************************************
A ProMED-mail post
ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases
Date: Sun 26 Sep 2010
Source: La Tercera, Chile [in Spanish, trans. Mod.TY, edited]
Cases of [hantavirus infection] 40 percent higher than in 2009
--------------------------------------------------------------
After 4 years during which it seemed that hanta [virus infections]
were controlled, based on the low number of cases, today the
situation has again become relevant [to public health]. To date,
there are 49 people infected with the disease [virus], "a figure
greater than what is expected for this period," according to the
Ministry of Health (MINSAL) epidemiological report. Of these, 17 died.
Given this, the authorities issued an alert to the assistance
network, "During the next months an expected seasonal increase will
begin for this disease. Because of this, the health teams must be
alert for early indications," the document stated.
The chief of Epidemiological Surveillance of MINSAL, Maritza Garcia,
explained that although the numbers are still lower than those
registered in an epidemic year (in 2001 there were 81 cases),
mortality is high and represents 35 percent of infections. This
increase [in the number of cases of hantavirus infection] is due to
an increase in the rodent population that transmits the disease
[virus] (the long-tailed pygmy rice rat [_Oligoryzomys
longicaudatus_]). "If this is a year of more rain, if the quila
plants [a perennial bamboo that grows in the humid temperate forests
of Chile and Argentina] are flowering more or if there is greater
availability of grain, on which the rodents feed, the disease spreads more.
She also added that when the disease [incidence] decreases, people
tend to relax their preventive measures, which also affects [the risk
of] infection.
The regions where the most cases have occurred are Biobio (14
[cases]) and Maule (9). In that respect, the Biobio health SEREMI
[Regional Ministerial Secretariat] epidemiologist, Cecilia Soto, said
that 93 percent of the infected individuals are males. "The
environmental conditions are by far an important factor, such as
firewood collection." Osvaldo Palma, of the Maule health SEREMI,
said, on the other hand, that despite "the earthquake, where many
families decided to remain living in their destroyed houses, this
year [2010] we have not had a substantial increase in cases."
[Byline: Ana Maria Morales]
--
Communicated by:
ProMED-ESP
[Cases of infection by a hantavirus continue and are increasing in
this region of central Chile. Although not stated, the hantavirus
involved in this and previous cases doubtless is Andes virus.
An image of the long-tailed pygmy rice rat (_Oligoryzomys
longicaudatus_), the sigmodontine rodent host of Andes hantavirus,
can be seen at
A map of Chile showing the administrative divisions including Biobio
and Maule regions can be seen at
A HealthMap/ProMED-mail interactive map of Chile can be accessed at
[see also:
Hantavirus update 2010 - Americas (27): Chile (OH) 20100701.2198
Hantavirus update 2010 - Americas (24): Chile, USA, susp 20100509.1509
Hantavirus update 2010 - Americas (23): Chile (BI) 20100506.1476
Hantavirus update 2010 - Americas (21): Chile, Argentina 20100427.1357
Hantavirus update 2010 - Americas (20): Chile (AR) 20100422.1305
Hantavirus update 2010 - Americas (19): Chile (LL) 20100422.1297
Hantavirus update 2010 - Americas (18): Chile (ML) 20100420.1285
Hantavirus update 2010 - Americas (16): Argentina, Chile 20100407.1125
Hantavirus update 2010 - Americas (15): Chile, Bolivia 20100402.1050
Hantavirus update 2010 - Americas (14): Chile (AI, LG) 20100329.0990
Hantavirus update 2010 - Americas (13): Chile 20100322.0915
Hantavirus update 2010 - Americas (07): Chile 20100215.0534
Hantavirus update 2010 - Americas (06): Chile 20100213.0515
Hantavirus update 2010 - Americas (05): Chile, conf. 20100210.0467
Hantavirus update 2010 - Americas (04): Chile, susp., RFI 20100209.0448
Hantavirus update 2010 - Americas (02): Chile 20100119.0210
Hantavirus update 2010 - Americas (01): Chile 20100108.0097]
...................................ty/mj/mpp
*##########################################################*
************************************************************
ProMED-mail makes every effort to verify the reports that
are posted, but the accuracy and completeness of the
information, and of any statements or opinions based
thereon, are not guaranteed. The reader assumes all risks in
using information posted or archived by ProMED-mail. ISID
and its associated service providers shall not be held
responsible for errors or omissions or held liable for any
damages incurred as a result of use or reliance upon posted
or archived material.
************************************************************
Donate to ProMED-mail. Details available at:
************************************************************
Visit ProMED-mail's web site at
Send all items for posting to: promed@promedmail.org (NOT to
an individual moderator). If you do not give your full name
name and affiliation, it may not be posted. You may unsub-
scribe at
For assistance from a human being, send mail to:
############################################################
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EEE / Equine Infections / Human Death
*Note: NO Infected Mosquitos Found
EASTERN EQUINE ENCEPHALITIS - USA (31): (NEW YORK), EQUINE, HUMAN
***********************************************
A ProMED-mail post
ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases
Date: 24 Sep 2010
Source: Syracuse.com [edited]
Two more horses in Onondaga County have tested positive for eastern
equine encephalitis, the county Health Department announced Friday
[24 Sep 2010] afternoon.
The horses, which were kept on Lamson Road in Lysander, became ill
and died on 17 Sep 2010, officials said.
So far, 3 cases of EEE have been confirmed this year [2010] in the
county, officials said. The 1st horse, which was stabled on Oswego
Road in Lysander, was euthanized on 10 Sep 2010.
An Onondaga County resident infected with the virus died earlier this
month [September 2010], the 4th human EEE death in Central New York since 1971.
County health officials Friday [24 Sep 2010] also announced that no
EEE was found among mosquitoes trapped last week and tested this week.
Although EEE cases are rare, the virus is one of the most serious
mosquito-borne diseases. About 1/3rd of people infected with it die.
Most survivors suffer significant brain damage. There is no specific
treatment for EEE, nor is there a human vaccine.
Symptoms can range from a mild flu-like illness to sudden fever,
muscle pains and a headache that's often followed quickly by seizures
and coma. Symptoms can appear within 5-15 days after the bite of an
infected mosquito. EEE is diagnosed through blood or spinal fluid.
Fresh water swamps like the Cicero Swamp are breeding grounds for
EEE-infected mosquitoes. The county conducted aerial spraying of the
swamp earlier this month [September 2010].
Dr. Cynthia Morrow, county health commissioner, urged people to
continue to remain vigilant and to take measures to reduce exposure
to mosquitoes.
She advised residents to use insect repellent, wear long-sleeve
shirts and long pants outdoors, and refrain from outdoor activity
during prime mosquito feeding times at dawn and dusk.
--
Communicated by:
ProMED-mail
[Although this article states that EEE cases are rare, clearly that
is in humans. This year [2010] has seen many equines affected with
this mosquito-borne disease. Mosquitoes transmit the disease to
horses and to people. Horses cannot transmit the disease to other
horses or to humans.
Horses can be given a preventative vaccine, and owners should
consider a spray or wipe-on product manufactured for the horse to
keep flies and mosquitoes off of the animals.
Human beings are encouraged to use mosquito repellant, avoid the
mosquito-prime times of dusk and dawn, to wear long sleeves when out
at these times, and to clean up any location of standing water that
may be a source of mosquito breeding. - Mod.TG]
[It is noteworthy that earlier this month (September 2010), there was
a human fatality from EEE in Onondaga County NY (see prior
ProMED-mail posting Eastern equine encephalitis - USA (27): (NY)
human 20100905.3188), and late last month (August 2010), there was a
report on an equine case of EEE in neighboring Oswego County NY.
For a map of New York State showing counties, see
. - Mod.MPP]
[see also;
Eastern equine encephalitis - USA (30): (AL, NE, OH) equine 20100918.3375
Eastern equine encephalitis - USA (29): (MI) 20100914.3311
Eastern equine encephalitis - USA (28): (MI,FL) 20100907.3202
Eastern equine encephalitis - USA (27): (NY) human 20100905.3188
Eastern equine encephalitis - USA (26): (MI, FL) equine, human 20100901.3115
Eastern equine encephalitis - USA (25): (MA) human 20100830.3089
Eastern equine encephalitis - USA (24): (NY, MI) equine, cervid 20100827.3045
Eastern equine encephalitis - USA (23): (MI) 20100824.2975
Eastern equine encephalitis - USA (22): (VA, MA) 20100820.2911
Eastern equine encephalitis - USA (21): (GA) equine 20100819.2893
Eastern equine encephalitis - USA (20): (FL), fatal 20100818.2871
Eastern equine encephalitis - USA (19): (MI) equine, human susp 20100817.2850
Eastern equine encephalitis - USA (18): (MA) equine, human 20100816.2836
Eastern equine encephalitis - USA (17): (FL) equine 20100815.2813
Eastern equine encephalitis - USA (16): (MI) 20100814.2790
Eastern equine encephalitis - USA (15): (FL) sentinel avian 20100810.2728
Eastern equine encephalitis - USA (14): (FL), equine, sentinel avian
20100807.2691
Eastern equine encephalitis, equine - USA (13) (FL, MA) 20100806.2675
Eastern equine encephalitis - USA (12): (MA) 20100803.2620
Eastern equine encephalitis - USA (11): (FL) fatal, human, equine 20100731.2569
Eastern equine encephalitis - USA (10): (MA, MI) 20100728.2529
Eastern equine encephalitis - USA (09): (FL) fatal 20100723.2469
Eastern equine encephalitis - USA (08): (LA) 20100716.2374
Eastern equine encephalitis - USA (07): (FL) 20100715.2363
Eastern equine encephalitis - USA (06): (FL, GA) 20100710.2312
Eastern equine encephalitis - USA (05): (FL) 20100708.2274
Eastern equine encephalitis - USA (04): (FL) 20100630.2178
Eastern equine encephalitis - USA (03): (FL) 20100627.2146
Eastern equine encephalitis - USA (02): (FL) sentinel avian 20100623.2101
Eastern equine encephalitis - USA: (FL) 20100527.1755]
.........................................sb/tg/msp/mpp
*##########################################################*
************************************************************
ProMED-mail makes every effort to verify the reports that
are posted, but the accuracy and completeness of the
information, and of any statements or opinions based
thereon, are not guaranteed. The reader assumes all risks in
using information posted or archived by ProMED-mail. ISID
and its associated service providers shall not be held
responsible for errors or omissions or held liable for any
damages incurred as a result of use or reliance upon posted
or archived material.
************************************************************
Donate to ProMED-mail. Details available at:
************************************************************
Visit ProMED-mail's web site at.
Send all items for posting to: promed@promedmail.org (NOT to
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EASTERN EQUINE ENCEPHALITIS - USA (31): (NEW YORK), EQUINE, HUMAN
***********************************************
A ProMED-mail post
ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases
Date: 24 Sep 2010
Source: Syracuse.com [edited]
Two more horses in Onondaga County have tested positive for eastern
equine encephalitis, the county Health Department announced Friday
[24 Sep 2010] afternoon.
The horses, which were kept on Lamson Road in Lysander, became ill
and died on 17 Sep 2010, officials said.
So far, 3 cases of EEE have been confirmed this year [2010] in the
county, officials said. The 1st horse, which was stabled on Oswego
Road in Lysander, was euthanized on 10 Sep 2010.
An Onondaga County resident infected with the virus died earlier this
month [September 2010], the 4th human EEE death in Central New York since 1971.
County health officials Friday [24 Sep 2010] also announced that no
EEE was found among mosquitoes trapped last week and tested this week.
Although EEE cases are rare, the virus is one of the most serious
mosquito-borne diseases. About 1/3rd of people infected with it die.
Most survivors suffer significant brain damage. There is no specific
treatment for EEE, nor is there a human vaccine.
Symptoms can range from a mild flu-like illness to sudden fever,
muscle pains and a headache that's often followed quickly by seizures
and coma. Symptoms can appear within 5-15 days after the bite of an
infected mosquito. EEE is diagnosed through blood or spinal fluid.
Fresh water swamps like the Cicero Swamp are breeding grounds for
EEE-infected mosquitoes. The county conducted aerial spraying of the
swamp earlier this month [September 2010].
Dr. Cynthia Morrow, county health commissioner, urged people to
continue to remain vigilant and to take measures to reduce exposure
to mosquitoes.
She advised residents to use insect repellent, wear long-sleeve
shirts and long pants outdoors, and refrain from outdoor activity
during prime mosquito feeding times at dawn and dusk.
--
Communicated by:
ProMED-mail
[Although this article states that EEE cases are rare, clearly that
is in humans. This year [2010] has seen many equines affected with
this mosquito-borne disease. Mosquitoes transmit the disease to
horses and to people. Horses cannot transmit the disease to other
horses or to humans.
Horses can be given a preventative vaccine, and owners should
consider a spray or wipe-on product manufactured for the horse to
keep flies and mosquitoes off of the animals.
Human beings are encouraged to use mosquito repellant, avoid the
mosquito-prime times of dusk and dawn, to wear long sleeves when out
at these times, and to clean up any location of standing water that
may be a source of mosquito breeding. - Mod.TG]
[It is noteworthy that earlier this month (September 2010), there was
a human fatality from EEE in Onondaga County NY (see prior
ProMED-mail posting Eastern equine encephalitis - USA (27): (NY)
human 20100905.3188), and late last month (August 2010), there was a
report on an equine case of EEE in neighboring Oswego County NY.
For a map of New York State showing counties, see
[see also;
Eastern equine encephalitis - USA (30): (AL, NE, OH) equine 20100918.3375
Eastern equine encephalitis - USA (29): (MI) 20100914.3311
Eastern equine encephalitis - USA (28): (MI,FL) 20100907.3202
Eastern equine encephalitis - USA (27): (NY) human 20100905.3188
Eastern equine encephalitis - USA (26): (MI, FL) equine, human 20100901.3115
Eastern equine encephalitis - USA (25): (MA) human 20100830.3089
Eastern equine encephalitis - USA (24): (NY, MI) equine, cervid 20100827.3045
Eastern equine encephalitis - USA (23): (MI) 20100824.2975
Eastern equine encephalitis - USA (22): (VA, MA) 20100820.2911
Eastern equine encephalitis - USA (21): (GA) equine 20100819.2893
Eastern equine encephalitis - USA (20): (FL), fatal 20100818.2871
Eastern equine encephalitis - USA (19): (MI) equine, human susp 20100817.2850
Eastern equine encephalitis - USA (18): (MA) equine, human 20100816.2836
Eastern equine encephalitis - USA (17): (FL) equine 20100815.2813
Eastern equine encephalitis - USA (16): (MI) 20100814.2790
Eastern equine encephalitis - USA (15): (FL) sentinel avian 20100810.2728
Eastern equine encephalitis - USA (14): (FL), equine, sentinel avian
20100807.2691
Eastern equine encephalitis, equine - USA (13) (FL, MA) 20100806.2675
Eastern equine encephalitis - USA (12): (MA) 20100803.2620
Eastern equine encephalitis - USA (11): (FL) fatal, human, equine 20100731.2569
Eastern equine encephalitis - USA (10): (MA, MI) 20100728.2529
Eastern equine encephalitis - USA (09): (FL) fatal 20100723.2469
Eastern equine encephalitis - USA (08): (LA) 20100716.2374
Eastern equine encephalitis - USA (07): (FL) 20100715.2363
Eastern equine encephalitis - USA (06): (FL, GA) 20100710.2312
Eastern equine encephalitis - USA (05): (FL) 20100708.2274
Eastern equine encephalitis - USA (04): (FL) 20100630.2178
Eastern equine encephalitis - USA (03): (FL) 20100627.2146
Eastern equine encephalitis - USA (02): (FL) sentinel avian 20100623.2101
Eastern equine encephalitis - USA: (FL) 20100527.1755]
.........................................sb/tg/msp/mpp
*##########################################################*
************************************************************
ProMED-mail makes every effort to verify the reports that
are posted, but the accuracy and completeness of the
information, and of any statements or opinions based
thereon, are not guaranteed. The reader assumes all risks in
using information posted or archived by ProMED-mail. ISID
and its associated service providers shall not be held
responsible for errors or omissions or held liable for any
damages incurred as a result of use or reliance upon posted
or archived material.
************************************************************
Donate to ProMED-mail. Details available at:
************************************************************
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Send all items for posting to: promed@promedmail.org (NOT to
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############################################################
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Thursday, September 23, 2010
New Enterobacteriaceae Resistant Isolate Enters U.S.
VERONA INTEGRON-ENCODED METALLO-BETA-LACTAMASE CARRYING
ENTEROBACTERIACEAE - USA ex GREECE: FIRST REPORT
What is Enterobacteriaceae? - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enterobacteriaceae
More info from CDC; http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5924a5.htm?s_cid=mm5924a5_w
Update: http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm59e0921a1.htm?s_cid=mm59e0921a1_w
********************************************************
A ProMED-mail post
ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases
Date: Tue 21 Sep 2010
Source: CDC. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2010; 59 (early release); 1-1 [edited]
In July 2010, CDC was notified of a patient with a
carbapenem-resistant _Klebsiella pneumoniae_ strain that produced a
Verona integron-encoded metallo-beta-lactamase (VIM) carbapenemase
(1) not reported previously among _Enterobacteriaceae_ in the USA.
The patient was a woman from the USA who became ill with diarrhea
during a Mediterranean cruise and was hospitalized in Greece, where
she received a diagnosis of sepsis and _Clostridium difficile_ infection.
After 12 days in 2 hospitals in Greece, she was transferred to a
hospital in the USA for continued management of sepsis and acute
renal failure. On admission, blood was drawn for culture through a
central venous catheter that had been placed while the patient was
hospitalized in Greece. The blood subsequently grew
carbapenemase-producing _Klebsiella pneumoniae_ exhibiting the VIM
resistance mechanism, which has been described previously in Greece
but not in the USA. Further testing showed the isolate to be non
susceptible to all antimicrobials usually used to treat _Klebsiella_.
Despite the resistance of the _Klebsiella_ strain, the patient
recovered sufficiently to be discharged after 26 days in the American
hospital. A search for other patients colonized with the same isolate
was conducted by screening 22 patients whose hospital stays
overlapped with this patient; no carbapenem-resistant
_Enterobacteriaceae_ (CRE) were detected.
This report of a VIM-producing CRE follows a June 2010 report of 3
cases of New Delhi metallo-beta-lactamase (NDM-1)-producing
_Enterobacteriaceae_ (2). However, the most common mechanism of
carbapenem resistance among _Enterobacteriaceae_ in the USA remains
the production of the _Klebsiella pneumoniae_ carbapenemase (KPC).
KPC-producing _Enterobacteriaceae_ are widespread in the USA and
other countries (3). Cases of CRE are a significant, emerging public
health problem regardless of the mechanism of carbapenem resistance,
and procedures to rapidly recognize and report CRE cases to infection
prevention personnel should be in place in all acute and
long-term-care facilities. Facilities that have not identified cases
of CRE should undertake periodic laboratory reviews to identify
cases. Patients with CRE should be managed using contact precautions,
and patients exposed to CRE patients (such as roommates) should be
screened with surveillance cultures (3). State and local health
departments should promote adoption of current prevention guidance
and monitoring of the prevalence of these organisms in their jurisdictions (3).
Public health officials and health-care facility staff can consult
with the Division of Healthcare Quality Promotion at CDC on the best
practices for identifying and preventing transmission of these
organisms (e-mail:).
References
----------
1. Vatopoulos A: High rates of metallo-beta-lactamase-producing
_Klebsiella pneumoniae_ in Greece -- a review of the current
evidence. Euro Surveill 2008; 13(4): 1-6 [available at
].
2. CDC: Detection of _Enterobacteriaceae_ isolates carrying
metallo-beta-lactamase -- United States, 2010. MMWR 2010; 59(24): 750
[available at
].
3. CDC: Guidance for control of infections with carbapenem-resistant
or carbapenemase-producing _Enterobacteriaceae_ in acute care
facilities. MMWR 2009; 58(10): 256-60 [available at
].
--
Communicated by:
ProMED-mail
[The Verona integron-encoded metallo-beta-lactamase carbapenemases
(VIM-1 and VIM-2) were initially identified in carbapenem-resistant
_Pseudomonas aeruginosa_ in the Mediterranean basin. The VIM-1 gene
was originally cloned from a _P. aeruginosa_ strain from an outbreak
in the ICU of the University Hospital in Verona, Italy, hence the name.
Bacteria containing this enzyme have a very broad substrate range
including the carbapenems and most other beta-lactams. The enzymes
are encoded on mobile gene cassettes which have been inserted into an
integron. The integrons easily spread between organisms, playing a
major role in the spread of antimicrobial resistance in gram-negative bacilli.
This resistance gene is the 3rd to be highlighted in the news over
the past 6 weeks. - Mod.LL]
[see also:
NDM-1 carrying Enterobacteriaceae - worldwide ex India, Pakistan (02)
20100914.3325
NDM-1 carrying Enterobacteriaceae - worldwide ex India, Pakistan 20100817.2853
NDM-1 carrying Enterobacteriaceae - N America, UK ex India 20100815.2812
E. coli ST131 - USA: emerging drug-resistant pathogen worldwide 20100803.2607
Antimicrobial resistance monitoring - USA: 2007 report 20100506.1471
2007
----
E. coli, ESBL - UK 20071106.3614
2004
----
E. coli, ESBL - UK (Shropshire) (02) 20040718.1952
E. coli, ESBL - UK (Shropshire) 20040715.1920
2003
----
Acinetobacter, drug resistant - Iraq: RFI 20030417.0934
2002
----
Gram negative bacilli, ESBL - UK (Scotland) 20020527.4333]
...................................mpp/ll/mj/mpp
*##########################################################*
************************************************************
ProMED-mail makes every effort to verify the reports that
are posted, but the accuracy and completeness of the
information, and of any statements or opinions based
thereon, are not guaranteed. The reader assumes all risks in
using information posted or archived by ProMED-mail. ISID
and its associated service providers shall not be held
responsible for errors or omissions or held liable for any
damages incurred as a result of use or reliance upon posted
or archived material.
************************************************************
Donate to ProMED-mail. Details available at:
************************************************************
Visit ProMED-mail's web site at.
Send all items for posting to: promed@promedmail.org (NOT to
an individual moderator). If you do not give your full name
name and affiliation, it may not be posted. You may unsub-
scribe at.
For assistance from a human being, send mail to:
.
############################################################
############################################################
ENTEROBACTERIACEAE - USA ex GREECE: FIRST REPORT
What is Enterobacteriaceae? - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enterobacteriaceae
More info from CDC; http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5924a5.htm?s_cid=mm5924a5_w
Update: http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm59e0921a1.htm?s_cid=mm59e0921a1_w
********************************************************
A ProMED-mail post
ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases
Date: Tue 21 Sep 2010
Source: CDC. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2010; 59 (early release); 1-1 [edited]
In July 2010, CDC was notified of a patient with a
carbapenem-resistant _Klebsiella pneumoniae_ strain that produced a
Verona integron-encoded metallo-beta-lactamase (VIM) carbapenemase
(1) not reported previously among _Enterobacteriaceae_ in the USA.
The patient was a woman from the USA who became ill with diarrhea
during a Mediterranean cruise and was hospitalized in Greece, where
she received a diagnosis of sepsis and _Clostridium difficile_ infection.
After 12 days in 2 hospitals in Greece, she was transferred to a
hospital in the USA for continued management of sepsis and acute
renal failure. On admission, blood was drawn for culture through a
central venous catheter that had been placed while the patient was
hospitalized in Greece. The blood subsequently grew
carbapenemase-producing _Klebsiella pneumoniae_ exhibiting the VIM
resistance mechanism, which has been described previously in Greece
but not in the USA. Further testing showed the isolate to be non
susceptible to all antimicrobials usually used to treat _Klebsiella_.
Despite the resistance of the _Klebsiella_ strain, the patient
recovered sufficiently to be discharged after 26 days in the American
hospital. A search for other patients colonized with the same isolate
was conducted by screening 22 patients whose hospital stays
overlapped with this patient; no carbapenem-resistant
_Enterobacteriaceae_ (CRE) were detected.
This report of a VIM-producing CRE follows a June 2010 report of 3
cases of New Delhi metallo-beta-lactamase (NDM-1)-producing
_Enterobacteriaceae_ (2). However, the most common mechanism of
carbapenem resistance among _Enterobacteriaceae_ in the USA remains
the production of the _Klebsiella pneumoniae_ carbapenemase (KPC).
KPC-producing _Enterobacteriaceae_ are widespread in the USA and
other countries (3). Cases of CRE are a significant, emerging public
health problem regardless of the mechanism of carbapenem resistance,
and procedures to rapidly recognize and report CRE cases to infection
prevention personnel should be in place in all acute and
long-term-care facilities. Facilities that have not identified cases
of CRE should undertake periodic laboratory reviews to identify
cases. Patients with CRE should be managed using contact precautions,
and patients exposed to CRE patients (such as roommates) should be
screened with surveillance cultures (3). State and local health
departments should promote adoption of current prevention guidance
and monitoring of the prevalence of these organisms in their jurisdictions (3).
Public health officials and health-care facility staff can consult
with the Division of Healthcare Quality Promotion at CDC on the best
practices for identifying and preventing transmission of these
organisms (e-mail:
References
----------
1. Vatopoulos A: High rates of metallo-beta-lactamase-producing
_Klebsiella pneumoniae_ in Greece -- a review of the current
evidence. Euro Surveill 2008; 13(4): 1-6 [available at
2. CDC: Detection of _Enterobacteriaceae_ isolates carrying
metallo-beta-lactamase -- United States, 2010. MMWR 2010; 59(24): 750
[available at
3. CDC: Guidance for control of infections with carbapenem-resistant
or carbapenemase-producing _Enterobacteriaceae_ in acute care
facilities. MMWR 2009; 58(10): 256-60 [available at
--
Communicated by:
ProMED-mail
[The Verona integron-encoded metallo-beta-lactamase carbapenemases
(VIM-1 and VIM-2) were initially identified in carbapenem-resistant
_Pseudomonas aeruginosa_ in the Mediterranean basin. The VIM-1 gene
was originally cloned from a _P. aeruginosa_ strain from an outbreak
in the ICU of the University Hospital in Verona, Italy, hence the name.
Bacteria containing this enzyme have a very broad substrate range
including the carbapenems and most other beta-lactams. The enzymes
are encoded on mobile gene cassettes which have been inserted into an
integron. The integrons easily spread between organisms, playing a
major role in the spread of antimicrobial resistance in gram-negative bacilli.
This resistance gene is the 3rd to be highlighted in the news over
the past 6 weeks. - Mod.LL]
[see also:
NDM-1 carrying Enterobacteriaceae - worldwide ex India, Pakistan (02)
20100914.3325
NDM-1 carrying Enterobacteriaceae - worldwide ex India, Pakistan 20100817.2853
NDM-1 carrying Enterobacteriaceae - N America, UK ex India 20100815.2812
E. coli ST131 - USA: emerging drug-resistant pathogen worldwide 20100803.2607
Antimicrobial resistance monitoring - USA: 2007 report 20100506.1471
2007
----
E. coli, ESBL - UK 20071106.3614
2004
----
E. coli, ESBL - UK (Shropshire) (02) 20040718.1952
E. coli, ESBL - UK (Shropshire) 20040715.1920
2003
----
Acinetobacter, drug resistant - Iraq: RFI 20030417.0934
2002
----
Gram negative bacilli, ESBL - UK (Scotland) 20020527.4333]
...................................mpp/ll/mj/mpp
*##########################################################*
************************************************************
ProMED-mail makes every effort to verify the reports that
are posted, but the accuracy and completeness of the
information, and of any statements or opinions based
thereon, are not guaranteed. The reader assumes all risks in
using information posted or archived by ProMED-mail. ISID
and its associated service providers shall not be held
responsible for errors or omissions or held liable for any
damages incurred as a result of use or reliance upon posted
or archived material.
************************************************************
Donate to ProMED-mail. Details available at:
************************************************************
Visit ProMED-mail's web site at
Send all items for posting to: promed@promedmail.org (NOT to
an individual moderator). If you do not give your full name
name and affiliation, it may not be posted. You may unsub-
scribe at
For assistance from a human being, send mail to:
############################################################
############################################################
Tuesday, September 21, 2010
GAO to Investigate FBIs' 2001 Anthrax Investigation
ANTHRAX, HUMAN, 2001 - USA (06)
AmeriThrax: The FBI's Version; http://www.fbi.gov/anthrax/amerithraxlinks.htm
*******************************
A ProMED-mail post
ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases
Date: 20 Sep 2010
Source: SecurityInfoWatch.com/The Frederick News-Post, Maryland [edited]
GAO to review FBI's Ivins investigation
---------------------------------------
Investigation will seek to resolve unanswered questions surrounding
the 2001 anthrax attacks. The Government Accountability Office [GAO]
has launched an investigation into the scientific methods used by the
FBI to determine that Fort Detrick researcher Bruce Ivins was the
sole perpetrator of the 2001 anthrax attacks.
U.S. Rep. Rush Holt, who represents the New Jersey district from
which the letters were mailed, requested GAO's involvement as early
as 2007, but renewed his efforts after the FBI announced it had
closed its Amerithrax investigation last February [2010]. Holt and 4
other lawmakers originally proposed a list of 10 questions for GAO to
help answer, including how the anthrax spores used in the attacks
compared to anthrax produced in this country and in locations around
the world, what amount of time and material would go into creating
the quantity of anthrax spores used in the attacks, and why the FBI
had not yet been able to close the case.
The FBI questioned Ivins, a researcher at the U.S. Army Medical
Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, throughout the entire
investigation, but named him as the suspect only after he committed
suicide in July 2008.
Many of Ivins' former co-workers and several lawmakers -- including
Sen. Chuck Grassley, one of the 4 who helped Holt pursue the GAO
investigation and who has been a vocal critic of the FBI's work on
the case -- are still not convinced the FBI adequately proved Ivins'
guilt. "The American people need credible answers to many questions
raised by the original attacks and the subsequent FBI handling of the
case," Holt said in a news release. "I'm pleased the GAO has
responded to our request and will look into the scientific methods
used by the FBI."
Specifically, the GAO investigation will seek to answer 3 main questions:
- What forensic methods did the FBI use to conclude Ivins was the
sole perpetrator, and how reliable are those methods?
- What scientific concerns and uncertainties still remain regarding
the FBI's conclusion?
- What agencies monitor foreign containment labs, and how do they
monitor those labs?
Holt had also requested that several House of Representatives
committees question the FBI's methods and results, and he has called
for a commission similar to the one that looked into the government's
response to the 11 Sep 2001 attacks. Neither effort has made much
progress thus far. "It's still a priority for him," said Holt
spokesman Zach Goldberg. "He continues to get supporters for it, but
it hasn't gotten traction in the larger Congress, which is certainly
disappointing. He still feels that this is something that needs to be
looked at for a variety of reasons -- that the families deserve
answers to a myriad of questions."
Rep. Roscoe Bartlett, who represents Western Maryland, was not part
of the group that signed the letter to GAO but has been working to
get more answers since the FBI closed the Amerithrax case. "I welcome
the forthcoming investigation by the Congress' General Accounting
Office of a series of important unanswered questions about the FBI's
investigation," Bartlett said. "These questions have undermined the
credibility of the FBI's conclusions."
The GAO investigation will be the 1st congressionally directed review
of the FBI's case; another review, done by the National Academy of
Sciences, was requested by the FBI itself 2 years ago.
The NAS investigation is scheduled to wrap up by the end of [this]
year. In GAO's letter to Holt confirming it would look into the FBI
investigation, Ralph Dawn Jr., GAO managing director of congressional
relations, wrote that to avoid any overlap between the 2 groups'
investigations, they would 1st review the NAS study before
determining the scope of the GAO one. Goldberg said the GAO would
start its investigation soon, if it hadn't begun already. He said the
GAO hadn't announced a timeline for its investigation but said that
Holt wasn't worried about rushing things along. "Of course (Holt)
wants it to be comprehensive and not rushed in any way," Goldberg
said. "The important thing is that the questions get addressed."
[Byline: Megan Eckstein, The Frederick News-Post, Maryland)
--
Communicated by:
ProMED-mail
[The NAS committee has maintained an admirable silence and without
leaks. The release date for their report is not known but expected to
be sometime in the Fall and before Christmas. I suspect that this
efficiency is partly to blame for US Representative Holt's move to
get the GAO involved. We will not know the thoroughness of the NAS
investigation until its report is out. - Mod.MHJ]
[see also:
Anthrax, human, 2001 - USA (05) 20100424.1326
Anthrax, human, 2001 - USA (04) 20100324.0933
Anthrax, human, 2001 - USA (03) 20100305.0727
Anthrax, human, 2001 - USA (02): FBI case closed 20100219.0575
Anthrax, human, 2001 - USA 20100125.0281
2009
----
Anthrax, human, 2001 - USA (03): NAS review 20090507.1707
Anthrax, human, 2001 - USA (02): evidence 20090227.0817
Anthrax, human, 2001 - USA: review 20090104.0033
2008
----
Anthrax, human, 2001 - USA (12): comment 20080928.3074
Anthrax, human, 2001 - USA (11): review 20080924.3019
Anthrax, human, 2001 - USA (10): evidence 20080828.2696
Anthrax, human, 2001 - USA (09): evidence 20080819.2591
Anthrax, human, 2001 - USA (08): evidence, drugs 20080818.2566
Anthrax, human, 2001 - USA (07): letters, evidence 20080812.2492
Anthrax, human, 2001 - USA (06): letters, evidence 20080811.2488
Anthrax, human, 2001 - USA (05): letters, evidence 20080807.2428
Anthrax, human, 2001 - USA (04): letters, evidence 20080806.2412
Anthrax, human, 2001 - USA (03) 20080805.2406
Anthrax, human, 2001 - USA (02): letters, evidence 20080805.2392
Anthrax, human - USA 2001: letters, new suspect 20080803.2371]
...................sb/mhj/ejp/mpp
*##########################################################*
************************************************************
ProMED-mail makes every effort to verify the reports that
are posted, but the accuracy and completeness of the
information, and of any statements or opinions based
thereon, are not guaranteed. The reader assumes all risks in
using information posted or archived by ProMED-mail. ISID
and its associated service providers shall not be held
responsible for errors or omissions or held liable for any
damages incurred as a result of use or reliance upon posted
or archived material.
************************************************************
Donate to ProMED-mail. Details available at:
************************************************************
Visit ProMED-mail's web site at.
Send all items for posting to: promed@promedmail.org (NOT to
an individual moderator). If you do not give your full name
name and affiliation, it may not be posted. You may unsub-
scribe at.
For assistance from a human being, send mail to:
.
AmeriThrax: The FBI's Version; http://www.fbi.gov/anthrax/amerithraxlinks.htm
*******************************
A ProMED-mail post
ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases
Date: 20 Sep 2010
Source: SecurityInfoWatch.com/The Frederick News-Post, Maryland [edited]
GAO to review FBI's Ivins investigation
---------------------------------------
Investigation will seek to resolve unanswered questions surrounding
the 2001 anthrax attacks. The Government Accountability Office [GAO]
has launched an investigation into the scientific methods used by the
FBI to determine that Fort Detrick researcher Bruce Ivins was the
sole perpetrator of the 2001 anthrax attacks.
U.S. Rep. Rush Holt, who represents the New Jersey district from
which the letters were mailed, requested GAO's involvement as early
as 2007, but renewed his efforts after the FBI announced it had
closed its Amerithrax investigation last February [2010]. Holt and 4
other lawmakers originally proposed a list of 10 questions for GAO to
help answer, including how the anthrax spores used in the attacks
compared to anthrax produced in this country and in locations around
the world, what amount of time and material would go into creating
the quantity of anthrax spores used in the attacks, and why the FBI
had not yet been able to close the case.
The FBI questioned Ivins, a researcher at the U.S. Army Medical
Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, throughout the entire
investigation, but named him as the suspect only after he committed
suicide in July 2008.
Many of Ivins' former co-workers and several lawmakers -- including
Sen. Chuck Grassley, one of the 4 who helped Holt pursue the GAO
investigation and who has been a vocal critic of the FBI's work on
the case -- are still not convinced the FBI adequately proved Ivins'
guilt. "The American people need credible answers to many questions
raised by the original attacks and the subsequent FBI handling of the
case," Holt said in a news release. "I'm pleased the GAO has
responded to our request and will look into the scientific methods
used by the FBI."
Specifically, the GAO investigation will seek to answer 3 main questions:
- What forensic methods did the FBI use to conclude Ivins was the
sole perpetrator, and how reliable are those methods?
- What scientific concerns and uncertainties still remain regarding
the FBI's conclusion?
- What agencies monitor foreign containment labs, and how do they
monitor those labs?
Holt had also requested that several House of Representatives
committees question the FBI's methods and results, and he has called
for a commission similar to the one that looked into the government's
response to the 11 Sep 2001 attacks. Neither effort has made much
progress thus far. "It's still a priority for him," said Holt
spokesman Zach Goldberg. "He continues to get supporters for it, but
it hasn't gotten traction in the larger Congress, which is certainly
disappointing. He still feels that this is something that needs to be
looked at for a variety of reasons -- that the families deserve
answers to a myriad of questions."
Rep. Roscoe Bartlett, who represents Western Maryland, was not part
of the group that signed the letter to GAO but has been working to
get more answers since the FBI closed the Amerithrax case. "I welcome
the forthcoming investigation by the Congress' General Accounting
Office of a series of important unanswered questions about the FBI's
investigation," Bartlett said. "These questions have undermined the
credibility of the FBI's conclusions."
The GAO investigation will be the 1st congressionally directed review
of the FBI's case; another review, done by the National Academy of
Sciences, was requested by the FBI itself 2 years ago.
The NAS investigation is scheduled to wrap up by the end of [this]
year. In GAO's letter to Holt confirming it would look into the FBI
investigation, Ralph Dawn Jr., GAO managing director of congressional
relations, wrote that to avoid any overlap between the 2 groups'
investigations, they would 1st review the NAS study before
determining the scope of the GAO one. Goldberg said the GAO would
start its investigation soon, if it hadn't begun already. He said the
GAO hadn't announced a timeline for its investigation but said that
Holt wasn't worried about rushing things along. "Of course (Holt)
wants it to be comprehensive and not rushed in any way," Goldberg
said. "The important thing is that the questions get addressed."
[Byline: Megan Eckstein, The Frederick News-Post, Maryland)
--
Communicated by:
ProMED-mail
[The NAS committee has maintained an admirable silence and without
leaks. The release date for their report is not known but expected to
be sometime in the Fall and before Christmas. I suspect that this
efficiency is partly to blame for US Representative Holt's move to
get the GAO involved. We will not know the thoroughness of the NAS
investigation until its report is out. - Mod.MHJ]
[see also:
Anthrax, human, 2001 - USA (05) 20100424.1326
Anthrax, human, 2001 - USA (04) 20100324.0933
Anthrax, human, 2001 - USA (03) 20100305.0727
Anthrax, human, 2001 - USA (02): FBI case closed 20100219.0575
Anthrax, human, 2001 - USA 20100125.0281
2009
----
Anthrax, human, 2001 - USA (03): NAS review 20090507.1707
Anthrax, human, 2001 - USA (02): evidence 20090227.0817
Anthrax, human, 2001 - USA: review 20090104.0033
2008
----
Anthrax, human, 2001 - USA (12): comment 20080928.3074
Anthrax, human, 2001 - USA (11): review 20080924.3019
Anthrax, human, 2001 - USA (10): evidence 20080828.2696
Anthrax, human, 2001 - USA (09): evidence 20080819.2591
Anthrax, human, 2001 - USA (08): evidence, drugs 20080818.2566
Anthrax, human, 2001 - USA (07): letters, evidence 20080812.2492
Anthrax, human, 2001 - USA (06): letters, evidence 20080811.2488
Anthrax, human, 2001 - USA (05): letters, evidence 20080807.2428
Anthrax, human, 2001 - USA (04): letters, evidence 20080806.2412
Anthrax, human, 2001 - USA (03) 20080805.2406
Anthrax, human, 2001 - USA (02): letters, evidence 20080805.2392
Anthrax, human - USA 2001: letters, new suspect 20080803.2371]
...................sb/mhj/ejp/mpp
*##########################################################*
************************************************************
ProMED-mail makes every effort to verify the reports that
are posted, but the accuracy and completeness of the
information, and of any statements or opinions based
thereon, are not guaranteed. The reader assumes all risks in
using information posted or archived by ProMED-mail. ISID
and its associated service providers shall not be held
responsible for errors or omissions or held liable for any
damages incurred as a result of use or reliance upon posted
or archived material.
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************************************************************
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Pasteurella / Pneumonia , Ovine / Big Horn Sheep - Washington
Pasteurella / Pneumonia as a Biological Weapon; http://www.iom.edu/~/media/Files/Report%20Files/2007/Long-Term-Health-Effects-of-Participation-in-Project-SHAD-Shipboard-Hazard-and-Defense/PASTEURELLAFRANCISELLATULARENSIS.ashx
PNEUMONIA, OVINE - USA (11): (WASHINGTON) BIGHORN SHEEP
*******************************************************
A ProMED-mail post
ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases
Date: Sat 18 Sep 2010
Source: The Seattle Times, Yakima Herald-Republic report [edited]
Deadly illness spreading among bighorn sheep
--------------------------------------------
State wildlife biologists made the gut-wrenching decision last spring
[2010] to kill dozens of sick bighorns west of the Yakima River
Canyon in hopes of keeping a pneumonia outbreak from reaching the
herd across the river.
It didn't work. Roughly two-thirds of the lambs born this spring
[2010] east of the canyon are believed to have died. And although
biologists haven't verified deaths among the adults, hunters on a
special-permit hunt on that side of the river last week reported
seeing adult rams coughing.
Tissue samples from the rams killed by those hunters will be
disease-tested at Washington State University, but the findings are
expected to take weeks. Until then, state Department of Fish and
Wildlife biologists only know what they see. And it doesn't look good.
"Something bad is going on," said Jeff Bernatowicz, a Yakima-based
sate wildlife biologist. "If the lambs are dying, hey, the signs are
there -- the warning signs are flashing in front of us. Almost
without a doubt the bacterium has jumped the river and is now on the
east side."
The initial breakout on the west side of the canyon began in December
[2009], when at least 10 bighorns died from pneumonia, most of them
north of Umtanum Creek.
State wildlife managers decided to remove the remaining wild sheep
showing signs of the illness to keep the outbreak from infecting
nearby herds, potentially resulting in a mass die-off similar to
those in nearby states.
State biologists and others from the US Department of Agriculture
Wildlife Services removed 69 bighorns on the west side of the canyon,
most of them showing obvious signs of illness.
But the biologists also removed several seemingly healthy adults, and
those animals also were found to be infected with _Pasteurella_, a
bacterial parasite typically found in the lungs of pneumonic bighorns.
"What we found was west of the river, every single animal looked like
it had been exposed," Bernatowicz said. "There wasn't a single one
that hadn't been.
"The culling was designed to remove the sick animals and keep the
healthy ones, and the hope was by doing that the lambs would survive.
The theory was if you removed the animals that were actually shedding
the bacteria, the lambs would have a better chance."
But even that didn't work. In the herd west of the canyon --
estimated at about 200 bighorns before last winter's [2009-10]
outbreak -- all but 4 of this year's [2010] lambs have already died.
"And there's no guarantee they'll survive," Bernatowicz said.
The same thing may ultimately happen with the herd east of the
canyon, which has been holding at about 100 sheep. This year's aerial
surveys of the bighorns in the Selah Butte area east of the river
have seen a steady lamb decline.
A 22 May 2010 survey found 32 lambs along with 71 ewes. That meant
roughly 45 of the herd's lambs had ewes, "just about exactly normal,"
according to Bernatowicz.
On 7 Jul 2010, the aerial spotters found 47 ewes -- the others were
believed to be hiding at the 1st sound of the approaching helicopter
-- and 20 lambs, which still represented a healthy lamb-to-ewe ratio.
But on 2 Sep 2010, the 58 ewes spotted had only 9 lambs with them.
State biologists aren't likely to know for weeks how deadly an impact
the disease will have to those adults, or whether any of the lambs
will survive.
Still, even with the disease still spreading, there is still room for
optimism, Bernatowicz said.
"The good thing is we still have 200 animals out there, west and east
(of the river). That's quite a few animals to be working with,"
Bernatowicz said. "It isn't like it's been knocked down to 20 or 30.
So if this thing gets turned around and they start producing lambs
again that survive, we could still be in pretty good shape."
[Byline: Scott Sandsberry]
--
Communicated by:
ProMED-mail
[While no one wishes to see the sheep suffer, it seems there should
be a better way of controlling the disease than herd culling, which
may not be working either.
An important update regarding the causative agents in these outbreaks
in bighorn sheep is in ProMED-mail post 20100815.2814. Readers are
encouraged to read this post. - Mod.TG]
[ProMED-mail would like to thank Peter Cyrog, DVM for submitting a
similar newswire on this current outbreak. - Mod.MPP]
[The state of Washington can be located on the HealthMap/ProMED-mail
interactive map at.
A Yakima River map can be seen at
. - Sr.Tech.Ed.MJ]
[see also:
Pneumonia, ovine - USA (10): (MT) bighorn sheep 20100827.3047
Pneumonia, ovine - USA (09): (MT) bighorn sheep 20100815.2814
Pneumonia, ovine - USA (08): (MT) bighorn sheep 20100814.2794
Pneumonia, ovine - USA (07): (NV) 20100228.0668
Pneumonia, ovine - USA (06): (WA) 20100210.0459
Pneumonia, ovine - USA (05): (MT) bighorn sheep 20100205.0391
Pneumonia, ovine - USA (04): (MT), bighorn sheep 20100124.0272
Pneumonia, ovine - USA (03): (MT), bighorn sheep 20100124.0262
Pneumonia, ovine - USA (02): (MT), bighorn sheep 20100117.0197
2009
----
Pneumonia, ovine - USA: (NV) bighorn sheep 20100109.0105
2008
----
Pasteurella pneumonia, Big Horn sheep - USA: (MT) 20080119.0248
2004
----
Pasteurella pneumonia, Big Horn sheep - USA (ID)(02) 20040415.1040
Pasteurella pneumonia, Big Horn sheep - USA (ID) 20040414.1010
1996
----
Pasteurella pneumonia, Big Horn Sheep - USA (5) 19960130.0221
Pasteurella pneumonia, Big Horn Sheep - USA (4) 19960129.0209
Pasteurella pneumonia, Big Horn Sheep - USA (3) 19960126.0187
Pasteurella pneumonia, Big Horn Sheep - USA (2) 19960126.0186
Pasteurella pneumonia, Big Horn Sheep 19960124.0168]
...................................sb/tg/mj/mpp
*##########################################################*
************************************************************
ProMED-mail makes every effort to verify the reports that
are posted, but the accuracy and completeness of the
information, and of any statements or opinions based
thereon, are not guaranteed. The reader assumes all risks in
using information posted or archived by ProMED-mail. ISID
and its associated service providers shall not be held
responsible for errors or omissions or held liable for any
damages incurred as a result of use or reliance upon posted
or archived material.
************************************************************
Donate to ProMED-mail. Details available at:
************************************************************
Visit ProMED-mail's web site at.
Send all items for posting to: promed@promedmail.org (NOT to
an individual moderator). If you do not give your full name
name and affiliation, it may not be posted. You may unsub-
scribe at.
For assistance from a human being, send mail to:
.
############################################################
############################################################
PNEUMONIA, OVINE - USA (11): (WASHINGTON) BIGHORN SHEEP
*******************************************************
A ProMED-mail post
ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases
Date: Sat 18 Sep 2010
Source: The Seattle Times, Yakima Herald-Republic report [edited]
Deadly illness spreading among bighorn sheep
--------------------------------------------
State wildlife biologists made the gut-wrenching decision last spring
[2010] to kill dozens of sick bighorns west of the Yakima River
Canyon in hopes of keeping a pneumonia outbreak from reaching the
herd across the river.
It didn't work. Roughly two-thirds of the lambs born this spring
[2010] east of the canyon are believed to have died. And although
biologists haven't verified deaths among the adults, hunters on a
special-permit hunt on that side of the river last week reported
seeing adult rams coughing.
Tissue samples from the rams killed by those hunters will be
disease-tested at Washington State University, but the findings are
expected to take weeks. Until then, state Department of Fish and
Wildlife biologists only know what they see. And it doesn't look good.
"Something bad is going on," said Jeff Bernatowicz, a Yakima-based
sate wildlife biologist. "If the lambs are dying, hey, the signs are
there -- the warning signs are flashing in front of us. Almost
without a doubt the bacterium has jumped the river and is now on the
east side."
The initial breakout on the west side of the canyon began in December
[2009], when at least 10 bighorns died from pneumonia, most of them
north of Umtanum Creek.
State wildlife managers decided to remove the remaining wild sheep
showing signs of the illness to keep the outbreak from infecting
nearby herds, potentially resulting in a mass die-off similar to
those in nearby states.
State biologists and others from the US Department of Agriculture
Wildlife Services removed 69 bighorns on the west side of the canyon,
most of them showing obvious signs of illness.
But the biologists also removed several seemingly healthy adults, and
those animals also were found to be infected with _Pasteurella_, a
bacterial parasite typically found in the lungs of pneumonic bighorns.
"What we found was west of the river, every single animal looked like
it had been exposed," Bernatowicz said. "There wasn't a single one
that hadn't been.
"The culling was designed to remove the sick animals and keep the
healthy ones, and the hope was by doing that the lambs would survive.
The theory was if you removed the animals that were actually shedding
the bacteria, the lambs would have a better chance."
But even that didn't work. In the herd west of the canyon --
estimated at about 200 bighorns before last winter's [2009-10]
outbreak -- all but 4 of this year's [2010] lambs have already died.
"And there's no guarantee they'll survive," Bernatowicz said.
The same thing may ultimately happen with the herd east of the
canyon, which has been holding at about 100 sheep. This year's aerial
surveys of the bighorns in the Selah Butte area east of the river
have seen a steady lamb decline.
A 22 May 2010 survey found 32 lambs along with 71 ewes. That meant
roughly 45 of the herd's lambs had ewes, "just about exactly normal,"
according to Bernatowicz.
On 7 Jul 2010, the aerial spotters found 47 ewes -- the others were
believed to be hiding at the 1st sound of the approaching helicopter
-- and 20 lambs, which still represented a healthy lamb-to-ewe ratio.
But on 2 Sep 2010, the 58 ewes spotted had only 9 lambs with them.
State biologists aren't likely to know for weeks how deadly an impact
the disease will have to those adults, or whether any of the lambs
will survive.
Still, even with the disease still spreading, there is still room for
optimism, Bernatowicz said.
"The good thing is we still have 200 animals out there, west and east
(of the river). That's quite a few animals to be working with,"
Bernatowicz said. "It isn't like it's been knocked down to 20 or 30.
So if this thing gets turned around and they start producing lambs
again that survive, we could still be in pretty good shape."
[Byline: Scott Sandsberry]
--
Communicated by:
ProMED-mail
[While no one wishes to see the sheep suffer, it seems there should
be a better way of controlling the disease than herd culling, which
may not be working either.
An important update regarding the causative agents in these outbreaks
in bighorn sheep is in ProMED-mail post 20100815.2814. Readers are
encouraged to read this post. - Mod.TG]
[ProMED-mail would like to thank Peter Cyrog, DVM for submitting a
similar newswire on this current outbreak. - Mod.MPP]
[The state of Washington can be located on the HealthMap/ProMED-mail
interactive map at
A Yakima River map can be seen at
[see also:
Pneumonia, ovine - USA (10): (MT) bighorn sheep 20100827.3047
Pneumonia, ovine - USA (09): (MT) bighorn sheep 20100815.2814
Pneumonia, ovine - USA (08): (MT) bighorn sheep 20100814.2794
Pneumonia, ovine - USA (07): (NV) 20100228.0668
Pneumonia, ovine - USA (06): (WA) 20100210.0459
Pneumonia, ovine - USA (05): (MT) bighorn sheep 20100205.0391
Pneumonia, ovine - USA (04): (MT), bighorn sheep 20100124.0272
Pneumonia, ovine - USA (03): (MT), bighorn sheep 20100124.0262
Pneumonia, ovine - USA (02): (MT), bighorn sheep 20100117.0197
2009
----
Pneumonia, ovine - USA: (NV) bighorn sheep 20100109.0105
2008
----
Pasteurella pneumonia, Big Horn sheep - USA: (MT) 20080119.0248
2004
----
Pasteurella pneumonia, Big Horn sheep - USA (ID)(02) 20040415.1040
Pasteurella pneumonia, Big Horn sheep - USA (ID) 20040414.1010
1996
----
Pasteurella pneumonia, Big Horn Sheep - USA (5) 19960130.0221
Pasteurella pneumonia, Big Horn Sheep - USA (4) 19960129.0209
Pasteurella pneumonia, Big Horn Sheep - USA (3) 19960126.0187
Pasteurella pneumonia, Big Horn Sheep - USA (2) 19960126.0186
Pasteurella pneumonia, Big Horn Sheep 19960124.0168]
...................................sb/tg/mj/mpp
*##########################################################*
************************************************************
ProMED-mail makes every effort to verify the reports that
are posted, but the accuracy and completeness of the
information, and of any statements or opinions based
thereon, are not guaranteed. The reader assumes all risks in
using information posted or archived by ProMED-mail. ISID
and its associated service providers shall not be held
responsible for errors or omissions or held liable for any
damages incurred as a result of use or reliance upon posted
or archived material.
************************************************************
Donate to ProMED-mail. Details available at:
************************************************************
Visit ProMED-mail's web site at
Send all items for posting to: promed@promedmail.org (NOT to
an individual moderator). If you do not give your full name
name and affiliation, it may not be posted. You may unsub-
scribe at
For assistance from a human being, send mail to:
############################################################
############################################################
Monday, September 20, 2010
ANTHRAX, HUMAN, BOVINE - BANGLADESH (18): 65 NEW CASES REPORTED
***********************************************
A ProMED-mail post
ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases
[1]
Date: 20 Sep 2010
Source: Iedcr.org [edited]
Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh Institute of
Epidemiology, Disease Control and Research (IEDCR) Mohakhali, Dhaka-1212:
Number of Cutaneous Anthrax cases from 18 Aug to 20 Sep 2010:
Districts / Total / Change since last posting / In last 24 hours (20
Sep 2010) / Upazillas
(1) Pabna / 58 / 0 / 0 / Bera (11), Santhia (30), Faridpur (17)
(2) Sirajganj / 212 / 2* / 0 / Shadjadpur (56), Belkuchi (54),
Kamarkhanda (92), Ullapara* (10)
(3) Kushtia / 49 / 3* / 1 / Daulotpur (46), Bheramara* (3)
(4) Tangail / 26 / 0 / 0 / Ghatail (14), Gopalpur (12)
(5) Meherpur / 81 / 2 / 1 / Ganghi* (79), Mujibnagar (1) [data from
above URL - Mod.MHJ]
(6) Manikganj / 8 / 0 / 0 / Shaturia (8)
(7) Shatkhira / 1 / 0 / 0 / Sadar (1)
(8) Lalmonirhat / 107 / 31 / 0 / Sadar* (78), Aditmari* (29)
(9) Rajshahi / 8 / 1 / 0 / Chaghat (7), Tamore* (1**)
(10) Narayangonj / 9 / 0 / 0 / Araihajar (9)
(11) Laxmipur / 25 / 25 / 0 / Kamalnagar* (25)
(12) Chittagong / 1 / 1 / 0 / City* (1)
Total: 585 (2)
** Imported from Sirajganj
--
Communicated by:
ProMED-mail
[An increase of 65 apparently new cases since 16 Sep 2010. - Mod.MHJ]
******
[2]
Date: 19 Sep 2010
Source: Bdnews24.com [edited]
Government health officers have detected the 1st case of human
anthrax in Feni on Sunday [19 Sep 2010]. A 50-year-old resident of
Joynagar village under Mohamaya Union of Chagalnaia Upazila was found
to have anthrax during primary tests.
According to government officials, 583 cases [sic] have been detected
until Sunday [19 Sep 2010], with 63 new cases in the last 3 days.
Family members said the woman fell ill after eating beef that her son
had purchased from the local Chandgazi Bazar on 24 Aug 2010. A
boil-like skin lesion appeared on her right thigh. She was treated by
a village doctor and later in a private clinic. Upazila health and
family planning officer Mohammed Khairul Islam and Upazila livestock
officer Nurul Afsar went to the house on Sunday [19 Sep 2010] noon
after learning about the case and confirmed that she had contracted anthrax.
Khairul Islam said that enquiries were underway to ascertain whether
there were any more anthrax patients in the area.
On the previous day, beef traders in Chittagong claimed that their
trading had quartered due to the scare.
--
Communicated by:
ProMED-mail
[This upazila does not appear in the official 20 Sep 2010 statistics.
- Mod.MHJ]
******
[3]
Date: 20 Sep 2010
Source: Bdnews24.com [edited]
Government health officers have detected the 1st case of human
anthrax in Chuadanga. One man, 35, was identified to be infected with
anthrax at Mahmujumma village of the Sadar Upazila on Monday [20 Sep 2010].
Chuadanga Sadar Upazila medical officer Dr Wajed Ashraf Delwar told
bdnews24.com that they were informed of villagers' suspicion about a
father, 30, his wife, 26, and their son, 6, of Boalia village and of
the 35-year-old man of Mahmujumma village of being infected with
anthrax. On such information, a medical team along with district
civil surgeon Dr Lokman Hakim and livestock officer DD Ajoy Roy
visited the spot.
Ajoy Roy told bdnews24.com that they found the 35-year-old man to be
infected. After conducting tests, they said the wife and son had
gotten scabies.
"However, we could not check [the 30-year-old father], as he is
currently in Dhaka. The 35-year-old man left Dhaka after eating beef
at a relative's house. He started showing signs of the disease after
he reached home," the livestock officer added.
--
Communicated by:
ProMED-mail
[Another new upazila, but apparently an imported case from Dhaka, so
infected meat has apparently reached the capital. - Mod.MHJ]
[see also:
Anthrax, human, bovine - Bangladesh (17) 20100917.3373
Anthrax, human, bovine - Bangladesh (16) 20100915.3346
Anthrax, human, bovine - Bangladesh (15) 20100914.3323
Anthrax, human, bovine - Bangladesh (14) 20100910.3279
Anthrax, human, bovine - Bangladesh (13) 20100908.3236
Anthrax, human, bovine - Bangladesh (12): Id alert 20100907.3224
Anthrax, human, bovine - Bangladesh (11): widespread 20100905.3191
Anthrax, human, bovine - Bangladesh (10): (KU, TA) 20100902.3140
Anthrax, human, bovine - Bangladesh (09): (SR, PB) 20100831.3109
Anthrax, human, bovine - Bangladesh (08): (SR, PB) 20100828.3066
Anthrax, human, bovine - Bangladesh (07): (SR) 20100827.3044
Anthrax, human, bovine - Bangladesh (06): (SR) 20100826.3009
Anthrax, human, bovine - Bangladesh (05): (SR) conf. 20100825.2996
Anthrax, human, bovine - Bangladesh (04): (SR) susp. 20100824.2970
Anthrax, human, bovine - Bangladesh (03): (PB) susp. 20100823.2944
Anthrax, human, bovine - Bangladesh (02): (SR) 20100820.2914
Anthrax, human, bovine - Bangladesh: (TA) susp, RFI 20100421.1291]
.................................................mhj/msp/mpp
*##########################################################*
************************************************************
ProMED-mail makes every effort to verify the reports that
are posted, but the accuracy and completeness of the
information, and of any statements or opinions based
thereon, are not guaranteed. The reader assumes all risks in
using information posted or archived by ProMED-mail. ISID
and its associated service providers shall not be held
responsible for errors or omissions or held liable for any
damages incurred as a result of use or reliance upon posted
or archived material.
************************************************************
Donate to ProMED-mail. Details available at:
************************************************************
Visit ProMED-mail's web site at.
Send all items for posting to: promed@promedmail.org (NOT to
an individual moderator). If you do not give your full name
name and affiliation, it may not be posted. You may unsub-
scribe at.
For assistance from a human being, send mail to:
.
############################################################
############################################################
A ProMED-mail post
ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases
[1]
Date: 20 Sep 2010
Source: Iedcr.org [edited]
Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh Institute of
Epidemiology, Disease Control and Research (IEDCR) Mohakhali, Dhaka-1212:
Number of Cutaneous Anthrax cases from 18 Aug to 20 Sep 2010:
Districts / Total / Change since last posting / In last 24 hours (20
Sep 2010) / Upazillas
(1) Pabna / 58 / 0 / 0 / Bera (11), Santhia (30), Faridpur (17)
(2) Sirajganj / 212 / 2* / 0 / Shadjadpur (56), Belkuchi (54),
Kamarkhanda (92), Ullapara* (10)
(3) Kushtia / 49 / 3* / 1 / Daulotpur (46), Bheramara* (3)
(4) Tangail / 26 / 0 / 0 / Ghatail (14), Gopalpur (12)
(5) Meherpur / 81 / 2 / 1 / Ganghi* (79), Mujibnagar (1) [data from
above URL - Mod.MHJ]
(6) Manikganj / 8 / 0 / 0 / Shaturia (8)
(7) Shatkhira / 1 / 0 / 0 / Sadar (1)
(8) Lalmonirhat / 107 / 31 / 0 / Sadar* (78), Aditmari* (29)
(9) Rajshahi / 8 / 1 / 0 / Chaghat (7), Tamore* (1**)
(10) Narayangonj / 9 / 0 / 0 / Araihajar (9)
(11) Laxmipur / 25 / 25 / 0 / Kamalnagar* (25)
(12) Chittagong / 1 / 1 / 0 / City* (1)
Total: 585 (2)
** Imported from Sirajganj
--
Communicated by:
ProMED-mail
[An increase of 65 apparently new cases since 16 Sep 2010. - Mod.MHJ]
******
[2]
Date: 19 Sep 2010
Source: Bdnews24.com [edited]
Government health officers have detected the 1st case of human
anthrax in Feni on Sunday [19 Sep 2010]. A 50-year-old resident of
Joynagar village under Mohamaya Union of Chagalnaia Upazila was found
to have anthrax during primary tests.
According to government officials, 583 cases [sic] have been detected
until Sunday [19 Sep 2010], with 63 new cases in the last 3 days.
Family members said the woman fell ill after eating beef that her son
had purchased from the local Chandgazi Bazar on 24 Aug 2010. A
boil-like skin lesion appeared on her right thigh. She was treated by
a village doctor and later in a private clinic. Upazila health and
family planning officer Mohammed Khairul Islam and Upazila livestock
officer Nurul Afsar went to the house on Sunday [19 Sep 2010] noon
after learning about the case and confirmed that she had contracted anthrax.
Khairul Islam said that enquiries were underway to ascertain whether
there were any more anthrax patients in the area.
On the previous day, beef traders in Chittagong claimed that their
trading had quartered due to the scare.
--
Communicated by:
ProMED-mail
[This upazila does not appear in the official 20 Sep 2010 statistics.
- Mod.MHJ]
******
[3]
Date: 20 Sep 2010
Source: Bdnews24.com [edited]
Government health officers have detected the 1st case of human
anthrax in Chuadanga. One man, 35, was identified to be infected with
anthrax at Mahmujumma village of the Sadar Upazila on Monday [20 Sep 2010].
Chuadanga Sadar Upazila medical officer Dr Wajed Ashraf Delwar told
bdnews24.com that they were informed of villagers' suspicion about a
father, 30, his wife, 26, and their son, 6, of Boalia village and of
the 35-year-old man of Mahmujumma village of being infected with
anthrax. On such information, a medical team along with district
civil surgeon Dr Lokman Hakim and livestock officer DD Ajoy Roy
visited the spot.
Ajoy Roy told bdnews24.com that they found the 35-year-old man to be
infected. After conducting tests, they said the wife and son had
gotten scabies.
"However, we could not check [the 30-year-old father], as he is
currently in Dhaka. The 35-year-old man left Dhaka after eating beef
at a relative's house. He started showing signs of the disease after
he reached home," the livestock officer added.
--
Communicated by:
ProMED-mail
[Another new upazila, but apparently an imported case from Dhaka, so
infected meat has apparently reached the capital. - Mod.MHJ]
[see also:
Anthrax, human, bovine - Bangladesh (17) 20100917.3373
Anthrax, human, bovine - Bangladesh (16) 20100915.3346
Anthrax, human, bovine - Bangladesh (15) 20100914.3323
Anthrax, human, bovine - Bangladesh (14) 20100910.3279
Anthrax, human, bovine - Bangladesh (13) 20100908.3236
Anthrax, human, bovine - Bangladesh (12): Id alert 20100907.3224
Anthrax, human, bovine - Bangladesh (11): widespread 20100905.3191
Anthrax, human, bovine - Bangladesh (10): (KU, TA) 20100902.3140
Anthrax, human, bovine - Bangladesh (09): (SR, PB) 20100831.3109
Anthrax, human, bovine - Bangladesh (08): (SR, PB) 20100828.3066
Anthrax, human, bovine - Bangladesh (07): (SR) 20100827.3044
Anthrax, human, bovine - Bangladesh (06): (SR) 20100826.3009
Anthrax, human, bovine - Bangladesh (05): (SR) conf. 20100825.2996
Anthrax, human, bovine - Bangladesh (04): (SR) susp. 20100824.2970
Anthrax, human, bovine - Bangladesh (03): (PB) susp. 20100823.2944
Anthrax, human, bovine - Bangladesh (02): (SR) 20100820.2914
Anthrax, human, bovine - Bangladesh: (TA) susp, RFI 20100421.1291]
.................................................mhj/msp/mpp
*##########################################################*
************************************************************
ProMED-mail makes every effort to verify the reports that
are posted, but the accuracy and completeness of the
information, and of any statements or opinions based
thereon, are not guaranteed. The reader assumes all risks in
using information posted or archived by ProMED-mail. ISID
and its associated service providers shall not be held
responsible for errors or omissions or held liable for any
damages incurred as a result of use or reliance upon posted
or archived material.
************************************************************
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************************************************************
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Friday, September 17, 2010
CRIMEAN-CONGO HEMORRHAGIC FEVER - PAKISTAN (02): (KARACHI)
CCHF as Bioweapon; http://www.millennium-ark.net/News_Files/NBC/Bio.Bugs.Congo.html
CRIMEAN-CONGO HEMORRHAGIC FEVER - PAKISTAN (02): (KARACHI)
**********************************************************
A ProMED-mail post
ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases
Date: Thu 16 Sep 2010
Source: Dawn, local news [edited]
Another Congo fever case reported in 2 weeks
--------------------------------------------
A young tannery worker who was admitted to the city government-run
Abbasi Shaheed Hospital (ASH) for the treatment of dengue fever has
tested positive for viral Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever (CCHF)
virus infection as well. It was the 2nd such case of CCHF reported
from the city hospitals during the short span of 2 weeks, said
medical circles, adding that the 1st patient had been discharged from
a private hospital after his recovery.
Reports about 2 deaths from CCHF in July [2010] and the preceding
months this year set alarm bells ringing and the city and health
practitioners and relevant authorities have stressed the need [to
undertake] urgent preventive measures.
The medical superintendent of the ASH, Dr Hamid Zaheer, told the Dawn
[newspaper] on Wednesday [15 Sep 2010] that a 23-year-old patient, a
resident of Sector 9/E, Orangi Town, [had been] brought to the
hospital with pain, high-grade fever and respiratory problems. "As I
have been told by doctors, the patients bled 2 days back, following
which in addition to initial tests and symptomatic treatment, some
serological tests were conducted and it was known by Tuesday [14 Sep
2010] that the patient had tested positive both for dengue fever
[virus] and CCHF [virus] infections. Initially he was kept in the
intensive care unit, but now [he is being treated] in an isolation
ward of the hospital, while the doctors and paramedics have also been
asked to observe the appropriate protocol while [treating] the
patients in question," Dr Zaheer stated.
Of the 5 patients tested positive for the viral disease [CCHF} since
March [2010], 2 have survived, while one is under treatment at the
ASH.
The death of a patient, in his mid-thirties, a resident of Bismillah
Colony, Landhi, was confirmed by the Indus Hospital, Korangi, in July
[2010]. This patient was a butcher by profession -- said to be one of
the most vulnerable jobs to contract the highly infectious disease.
The occupation of the other patient who died from CCHF in May was not
known.
Some of the experts after knowing about the CCHF [cases] in July had
highlighted the need to undertake a retrospective study of CCHF
patients, [to determine] their occupations and their contact with
other people during the period of incubation of the virus, and to
determine the sensitivity of lab results and [communication of] a
timely update by the hospitals on the cases to the health authorities.
The deputy medical superintendent of the ASH, Dr Javed Akhtar, said
that the [23-year-old patient currently being treated], a worker at
tannery, was admitted to the hospital on Sat 11 Sep 2010 and was kept
in the Medical-III [ward] initially and then was transferred to the
medical intensive care unit (ICU) in view of his deteriorating
condition.
The laboratory of the Aga Khan University Hospital (AKUH) informed
the hospital on Tue 14 Sep 2010 of positive test results for dengue
fever virus infection and CCHF virus infection, and as a result the
patient was transferred to an isolation ward.
Relatives of of the patient had also been debarred from meeting him,
the doctor said, adding that the patient was being provided with
blood platelets, which had critically decreased. Replying to a
question, Dr Akhtar said that the AKUH laboratory handed over the
formal serology test report to the ASH on Wednesday [15 Sep 2010] for
this patient, who is now being given all possible care and is now in
a stable condition and conscious.
The head of the infections control committee of the AKUH, Dr Bushra
Jamil, told Dawn that the AKUH lab had tested 2 samples positive in
recent days for CCHF -- one pertained to a patient admitted to the
AKUH and discharged after recovery a week ago, and the other the
sample received from the ASH.
An expert said that the doctors and paramedics [known] to have come
into contact with these patient during treatment, and relatives of
the patients, also needed to be kept under observation as a
preventive measure. It is worth noting that a few years back a doctor
handling a patient suffering from CCHF later died of the same
disease. [Nosocomial transmission of infection in hospitals in
Pakistan has been recorded previously. In 2002, a female doctor
contracted CCHF virus infection from a patient and died. 2 doctors
involved in her treatment also contracted infection; both survived
(see: ProMED-mail post - Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever - Pakistan
(02) 20020313.3735).]
Previously, in 1974, a physician died in Rawalpindi General Hospital
as a result of CCHFV infection contracted from patients. - Mod.CP]
[Byline: Mukhtar Alam]
--
Communicated by:
ProMED-mail
[The geographical distribution of CCHF virus, like that of its tick
vectors (_Hyalomma_ spp.), is widespread. Evidence of CCHF virus has
been found in Africa, Asia, the Middle East and Eastern Europe.
Health care workers in endemic areas should be aware of the illness
and the correct infection control procedures to protect themselves
and their patients from the risk of nosocomial (hospital-acquired)
infection.
Humans who become infected with CCHF acquire the virus from contact
with blood or other infected tissues from livestock, or they may
become infected directly from a tick bite. The majority of cases have
occurred in those involved with the livestock industry, such as
agricultural workers, slaughterhouse workers and veterinarians.
Following infection via tick bite, the incubation period is usually
one to 3 days, with a maximum of 9 days.
The incubation period following contact with infected blood or
tissues is usually 5 to 6 days. Onset of symptoms is sudden, with
fever, myalgia (aching muscles), dizziness, neck pain and stiffness,
backache, headache, sore eyes and photophobia (sensitivity to light).
There may be nausea, vomiting and sore throat early on, which may be
accompanied by diarrhoea and generalised abdominal pain. Details of
the subsequent course of the illness can be found at:
.
The mortality rate from CCHF is approximately 30 percent, with death
occurring in the 2nd week of illness. In those patients who recover,
improvement generally begins on the 9th or 10th day after the onset
of illness.
Of the 5 CCHF patients treated in the city of Karachi in recent
months, 2 (a butcher and a tannery worker) have worked with livestock
or livestock products. The case of the 23-year-old tannery worker
described in the above report is exceptional in that the patient has
tested positive for 2 unrelated hemorrhagic fever viruses -- dengue
fever virus (a flavivirus) and CCHF virus (a bunyavirus). Further
information on the course, treatment and outcome of the tannery
worker's illness are matters of general interest and would be
welcomed.
The HealthMap/ProMED-mail interactive map of Pakistan, showing the
location of the city of Karachi can be accessed at:
. - Mod.CP]
[see also:
Crimean-Congo hem. fever - Pakistan ex Afghanistan: RFI 20100629.2161
2009
----
Crimean-Congo hem. fever - Pakistan (03): differential 20091012.3527
Crimean-Congo hem. fever - Pakistan (02): ex Saudi Arabia, susp. 20091011.3516
Crimean-Congo hem. fever - Pakistan (Abottabad): RFI 20090927.3377
2008
----
Crimean-Congo hem. fever - Pakistan (03): (PB), susp. 20081121.3678
Crimean-Congo hem. fever - Pakistan (02): (PB), susp. 20081117.3630
Crimean-Congo hem. fever - Pakistan: (BA) 20081027.3392]
...................arn/lm/cp/ejp/lm
*##########################################################*
************************************************************
ProMED-mail makes every effort to verify the reports that
are posted, but the accuracy and completeness of the
information, and of any statements or opinions based
thereon, are not guaranteed. The reader assumes all risks in
using information posted or archived by ProMED-mail. ISID
and its associated service providers shall not be held
responsible for errors or omissions or held liable for any
damages incurred as a result of use or reliance upon posted
or archived material.
************************************************************
Donate to ProMED-mail. Details available at:
************************************************************
Visit ProMED-mail's web site at.
Send all items for posting to: promed@promedmail.org (NOT to
an individual moderator). If you do not give your full name
name and affiliation, it may not be posted. You may unsub-
scribe at.
For assistance from a human being, send mail to:
.
############################################################
############################################################
CRIMEAN-CONGO HEMORRHAGIC FEVER - PAKISTAN (02): (KARACHI)
**********************************************************
A ProMED-mail post
ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases
Date: Thu 16 Sep 2010
Source: Dawn, local news [edited]
Another Congo fever case reported in 2 weeks
--------------------------------------------
A young tannery worker who was admitted to the city government-run
Abbasi Shaheed Hospital (ASH) for the treatment of dengue fever has
tested positive for viral Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever (CCHF)
virus infection as well. It was the 2nd such case of CCHF reported
from the city hospitals during the short span of 2 weeks, said
medical circles, adding that the 1st patient had been discharged from
a private hospital after his recovery.
Reports about 2 deaths from CCHF in July [2010] and the preceding
months this year set alarm bells ringing and the city and health
practitioners and relevant authorities have stressed the need [to
undertake] urgent preventive measures.
The medical superintendent of the ASH, Dr Hamid Zaheer, told the Dawn
[newspaper] on Wednesday [15 Sep 2010] that a 23-year-old patient, a
resident of Sector 9/E, Orangi Town, [had been] brought to the
hospital with pain, high-grade fever and respiratory problems. "As I
have been told by doctors, the patients bled 2 days back, following
which in addition to initial tests and symptomatic treatment, some
serological tests were conducted and it was known by Tuesday [14 Sep
2010] that the patient had tested positive both for dengue fever
[virus] and CCHF [virus] infections. Initially he was kept in the
intensive care unit, but now [he is being treated] in an isolation
ward of the hospital, while the doctors and paramedics have also been
asked to observe the appropriate protocol while [treating] the
patients in question," Dr Zaheer stated.
Of the 5 patients tested positive for the viral disease [CCHF} since
March [2010], 2 have survived, while one is under treatment at the
ASH.
The death of a patient, in his mid-thirties, a resident of Bismillah
Colony, Landhi, was confirmed by the Indus Hospital, Korangi, in July
[2010]. This patient was a butcher by profession -- said to be one of
the most vulnerable jobs to contract the highly infectious disease.
The occupation of the other patient who died from CCHF in May was not
known.
Some of the experts after knowing about the CCHF [cases] in July had
highlighted the need to undertake a retrospective study of CCHF
patients, [to determine] their occupations and their contact with
other people during the period of incubation of the virus, and to
determine the sensitivity of lab results and [communication of] a
timely update by the hospitals on the cases to the health authorities.
The deputy medical superintendent of the ASH, Dr Javed Akhtar, said
that the [23-year-old patient currently being treated], a worker at
tannery, was admitted to the hospital on Sat 11 Sep 2010 and was kept
in the Medical-III [ward] initially and then was transferred to the
medical intensive care unit (ICU) in view of his deteriorating
condition.
The laboratory of the Aga Khan University Hospital (AKUH) informed
the hospital on Tue 14 Sep 2010 of positive test results for dengue
fever virus infection and CCHF virus infection, and as a result the
patient was transferred to an isolation ward.
Relatives of of the patient had also been debarred from meeting him,
the doctor said, adding that the patient was being provided with
blood platelets, which had critically decreased. Replying to a
question, Dr Akhtar said that the AKUH laboratory handed over the
formal serology test report to the ASH on Wednesday [15 Sep 2010] for
this patient, who is now being given all possible care and is now in
a stable condition and conscious.
The head of the infections control committee of the AKUH, Dr Bushra
Jamil, told Dawn that the AKUH lab had tested 2 samples positive in
recent days for CCHF -- one pertained to a patient admitted to the
AKUH and discharged after recovery a week ago, and the other the
sample received from the ASH.
An expert said that the doctors and paramedics [known] to have come
into contact with these patient during treatment, and relatives of
the patients, also needed to be kept under observation as a
preventive measure. It is worth noting that a few years back a doctor
handling a patient suffering from CCHF later died of the same
disease. [Nosocomial transmission of infection in hospitals in
Pakistan has been recorded previously. In 2002, a female doctor
contracted CCHF virus infection from a patient and died. 2 doctors
involved in her treatment also contracted infection; both survived
(see: ProMED-mail post - Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever - Pakistan
(02) 20020313.3735).]
Previously, in 1974, a physician died in Rawalpindi General Hospital
as a result of CCHFV infection contracted from patients. - Mod.CP]
[Byline: Mukhtar Alam]
--
Communicated by:
ProMED-mail
[The geographical distribution of CCHF virus, like that of its tick
vectors (_Hyalomma_ spp.), is widespread. Evidence of CCHF virus has
been found in Africa, Asia, the Middle East and Eastern Europe.
Health care workers in endemic areas should be aware of the illness
and the correct infection control procedures to protect themselves
and their patients from the risk of nosocomial (hospital-acquired)
infection.
Humans who become infected with CCHF acquire the virus from contact
with blood or other infected tissues from livestock, or they may
become infected directly from a tick bite. The majority of cases have
occurred in those involved with the livestock industry, such as
agricultural workers, slaughterhouse workers and veterinarians.
Following infection via tick bite, the incubation period is usually
one to 3 days, with a maximum of 9 days.
The incubation period following contact with infected blood or
tissues is usually 5 to 6 days. Onset of symptoms is sudden, with
fever, myalgia (aching muscles), dizziness, neck pain and stiffness,
backache, headache, sore eyes and photophobia (sensitivity to light).
There may be nausea, vomiting and sore throat early on, which may be
accompanied by diarrhoea and generalised abdominal pain. Details of
the subsequent course of the illness can be found at:
The mortality rate from CCHF is approximately 30 percent, with death
occurring in the 2nd week of illness. In those patients who recover,
improvement generally begins on the 9th or 10th day after the onset
of illness.
Of the 5 CCHF patients treated in the city of Karachi in recent
months, 2 (a butcher and a tannery worker) have worked with livestock
or livestock products. The case of the 23-year-old tannery worker
described in the above report is exceptional in that the patient has
tested positive for 2 unrelated hemorrhagic fever viruses -- dengue
fever virus (a flavivirus) and CCHF virus (a bunyavirus). Further
information on the course, treatment and outcome of the tannery
worker's illness are matters of general interest and would be
welcomed.
The HealthMap/ProMED-mail interactive map of Pakistan, showing the
location of the city of Karachi can be accessed at:
[see also:
Crimean-Congo hem. fever - Pakistan ex Afghanistan: RFI 20100629.2161
2009
----
Crimean-Congo hem. fever - Pakistan (03): differential 20091012.3527
Crimean-Congo hem. fever - Pakistan (02): ex Saudi Arabia, susp. 20091011.3516
Crimean-Congo hem. fever - Pakistan (Abottabad): RFI 20090927.3377
2008
----
Crimean-Congo hem. fever - Pakistan (03): (PB), susp. 20081121.3678
Crimean-Congo hem. fever - Pakistan (02): (PB), susp. 20081117.3630
Crimean-Congo hem. fever - Pakistan: (BA) 20081027.3392]
...................arn/lm/cp/ejp/lm
*##########################################################*
************************************************************
ProMED-mail makes every effort to verify the reports that
are posted, but the accuracy and completeness of the
information, and of any statements or opinions based
thereon, are not guaranteed. The reader assumes all risks in
using information posted or archived by ProMED-mail. ISID
and its associated service providers shall not be held
responsible for errors or omissions or held liable for any
damages incurred as a result of use or reliance upon posted
or archived material.
************************************************************
Donate to ProMED-mail. Details available at:
************************************************************
Visit ProMED-mail's web site at
Send all items for posting to: promed@promedmail.org (NOT to
an individual moderator). If you do not give your full name
name and affiliation, it may not be posted. You may unsub-
scribe at
For assistance from a human being, send mail to:
############################################################
############################################################
BRUCELLOSIS, SWINE - LATVIA, OIE
Brucellosis as a biological weapon; http://www.springerlink.com/content/u4174nu585tk3842/
and here; http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16964579
BRUCELLOSIS, SWINE - LATVIA, OIE
********************************
A ProMED-mail post
ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases
Date: 16 Sept 2010
Source: OIE WAHID (World Animal Health Information Database) Disease
Information 2010; 23(37) [edited]
Brucellosis (_Brucella suis_), Latvia
-------------------------------------
Information received on 15 Sep 2010 from Mr Vinets Veldre, Chief
Veterinary Officer and General Director, Food and Veterinary Service,
Ministry of Agriculture, Riga, Latvia
Summary
Report type: Immediate notification
Start date 31 Aug 2010
Date of 1st confirmation of the event 11 Sep 2010
Report date 15 Sep 2010
Date submitted to OIE 15 Sep 2010
Reason for notification: Reoccurrence of a listed disease
Date of previous occurrence February 1994
Manifestation of disease: Clinical disease
Causal agent: Brucella suis
Nature of diagnosis Laboratory (basic), Laboratory (advanced)
This event pertains to a defined zone within the country
New outbreaks
Outbreak 1 Avoti, Talsi, Latvia
Date of start of the outbreak 31 Aug 2010
Outbreak status: Continuing (or date resolved not provided)
Epidemiological unit: Farm
Species Cattle
Susceptible 31
Cases 0
Deaths 0
Destroyed 0
Slaughtered 0
Species Swine
Susceptible 2055
Cases 8
Deaths 0
Destroyed 3
Slaughtered 0
Epidemiology - Source of the outbreak(s) or origin of infection;
Unknown or inconclusive
Control measures: Measures applied. Quarantine; Movement control
inside the country; Screening ; Modified stamping out; Vaccination
prohibited; No treatment of affected animals
Measures to be applied - Disinfection of infected premises/establishment(s)
Laboratory name and type: National Reference Laboratory (National laboratory)
Species Swine
Test bacteriological examination
Test date 11 Sep 2010
Result Positive
Species Swine
Test complement fixation test (CFT)
Test date 11 Sep 2010
Result Positive
Future Reporting
The event is continuing. Weekly follow-up reports will be submitted.
**
Communicated by:
ProMED-mail
[Brucellosis is zoonotic disease that can have a significant negative
impact on reproductive capacity on farms. It mainly affects cattle,
sheep, goats and pigs worldwide but also dogs, mice and even murine
species. Infections in feral pigs, bison, elk and European hares also
complicate the eradication picture and pose intermittent risks for
zoonotic transmission.
The Center for Food Security and Public Health at Iowa State
University's College of Veterinary Medicine (see
)
summarizes the geographic distribution as follows: _Brucella_ species
vary in their geographic distribution. _B. abortus_ is found
worldwide in cattle-raising regions except in Japan, Canada, some
European countries, Australia, New Zealand and Israel, where it has
been eradicated. Eradication from domesticated herds is nearly
complete in the U.S. _B. abortus_ persists in wildlife hosts in some
regions, including the Greater Yellowstone Area of North America.
_B. melitensis_ is particularly common in the Mediterranean. It also
occurs in the Middle East and Central Asia, around the Arabian Gulf
and in some countries of Central America. This organism has been
reported from Africa and India, but it does not seem to be endemic in
northern Europe, North America (except Mexico), Southeast Asia,
Australia or New Zealand.
_B. ovis_ probably occurs in most sheep-raising regions of the world.
It has been reported from Australia, New Zealand, North and South
America, South Africa and many countries in Europe.
In the past, _B. suis_ was found worldwide in swine-raising regions.
This organism has been eradicated from domesticated pigs in the U.S.,
Canada, many European countries and other nations. However, it
persists in wild and/or feral swine populations in some areas,
including the U.S., Europe and Queensland, Australia. Sporadic
outbreaks are reported in domesticated herds or humans due to
transmission from this source. _B. suis_ continues to occur in
domesticated herds in some countries of South and Central America
(including Mexico) and Asia. _B. suis_ biovars 1 and 3 are found
worldwide, but other biovars have a limited geographic distribution.
Biovar 2 occurs in wild boar in much of Europe. Biovar 4 (rangiferine
brucellosis) is limited to the Arctic regions of North America and
Russia including Siberia, Canada and Alaska. Biovar 5 (murine
brucellosis) is found in the former USSR.
According to the OIE WAHID database, _Brucella suis_ has sporadically
caused outbreaks in Europe over the last 5 years. It has occurred
both in commercial and feral swine populations. Armenia had an
outbreak in 2008; Croatia has reported outbreaks yearly since 2006 as
has been the case for the Czech Republic. France reported outbreaks
of _B. suis_ in 2006, 2008, 2009; Germany reported outbreaks in 2008
and 2009 as well as this year. Hungary report outbreaks in 2008 and
2009. Italy reported outbreaks every year including 2010 since 2006.
Romania reported outbreak in 2006 and 2008; while the former Serbia
and Montenegro reported an outbreak in 2006. Finally, both Spain and
Switzerland reported outbreaks in 2009. - Mod.PC]
[see also:
Brucellosis, swine - Germany: (BB), OIE 20100213.0508
Brucellosis, swine hunters - USA (02): (TX) hunters 20090920.3303
2008
----
Brucellosis, porcine - Germany: (MV), serovar 2 20080923.2995
Brucellosis, porcine - Germany: (MV) 20080918.2927
Brucellosis, porcine - Romania: OIE 20081011.3220]
...................pc/ejp/lm
*##########################################################*
************************************************************
ProMED-mail makes every effort to verify the reports that
are posted, but the accuracy and completeness of the
information, and of any statements or opinions based
thereon, are not guaranteed. The reader assumes all risks in
using information posted or archived by ProMED-mail. ISID
and its associated service providers shall not be held
responsible for errors or omissions or held liable for any
damages incurred as a result of use or reliance upon posted
or archived material.
************************************************************
Donate to ProMED-mail. Details available at:
************************************************************
Visit ProMED-mail's web site at.
Send all items for posting to: promed@promedmail.org (NOT to
an individual moderator). If you do not give your full name
name and affiliation, it may not be posted. You may unsub-
scribe at.
For assistance from a human being, send mail to:
.
############################################################
############################################################
and here; http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16964579
BRUCELLOSIS, SWINE - LATVIA, OIE
********************************
A ProMED-mail post
ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases
Date: 16 Sept 2010
Source: OIE WAHID (World Animal Health Information Database) Disease
Information 2010; 23(37) [edited]
Brucellosis (_Brucella suis_), Latvia
-------------------------------------
Information received on 15 Sep 2010 from Mr Vinets Veldre, Chief
Veterinary Officer and General Director, Food and Veterinary Service,
Ministry of Agriculture, Riga, Latvia
Summary
Report type: Immediate notification
Start date 31 Aug 2010
Date of 1st confirmation of the event 11 Sep 2010
Report date 15 Sep 2010
Date submitted to OIE 15 Sep 2010
Reason for notification: Reoccurrence of a listed disease
Date of previous occurrence February 1994
Manifestation of disease: Clinical disease
Causal agent: Brucella suis
Nature of diagnosis Laboratory (basic), Laboratory (advanced)
This event pertains to a defined zone within the country
New outbreaks
Outbreak 1 Avoti, Talsi, Latvia
Date of start of the outbreak 31 Aug 2010
Outbreak status: Continuing (or date resolved not provided)
Epidemiological unit: Farm
Species Cattle
Susceptible 31
Cases 0
Deaths 0
Destroyed 0
Slaughtered 0
Species Swine
Susceptible 2055
Cases 8
Deaths 0
Destroyed 3
Slaughtered 0
Epidemiology - Source of the outbreak(s) or origin of infection;
Unknown or inconclusive
Control measures: Measures applied. Quarantine; Movement control
inside the country; Screening ; Modified stamping out; Vaccination
prohibited; No treatment of affected animals
Measures to be applied - Disinfection of infected premises/establishment(s)
Laboratory name and type: National Reference Laboratory (National laboratory)
Species Swine
Test bacteriological examination
Test date 11 Sep 2010
Result Positive
Species Swine
Test complement fixation test (CFT)
Test date 11 Sep 2010
Result Positive
Future Reporting
The event is continuing. Weekly follow-up reports will be submitted.
**
Communicated by:
ProMED-mail
[Brucellosis is zoonotic disease that can have a significant negative
impact on reproductive capacity on farms. It mainly affects cattle,
sheep, goats and pigs worldwide but also dogs, mice and even murine
species. Infections in feral pigs, bison, elk and European hares also
complicate the eradication picture and pose intermittent risks for
zoonotic transmission.
The Center for Food Security and Public Health at Iowa State
University's College of Veterinary Medicine (see
summarizes the geographic distribution as follows: _Brucella_ species
vary in their geographic distribution. _B. abortus_ is found
worldwide in cattle-raising regions except in Japan, Canada, some
European countries, Australia, New Zealand and Israel, where it has
been eradicated. Eradication from domesticated herds is nearly
complete in the U.S. _B. abortus_ persists in wildlife hosts in some
regions, including the Greater Yellowstone Area of North America.
_B. melitensis_ is particularly common in the Mediterranean. It also
occurs in the Middle East and Central Asia, around the Arabian Gulf
and in some countries of Central America. This organism has been
reported from Africa and India, but it does not seem to be endemic in
northern Europe, North America (except Mexico), Southeast Asia,
Australia or New Zealand.
_B. ovis_ probably occurs in most sheep-raising regions of the world.
It has been reported from Australia, New Zealand, North and South
America, South Africa and many countries in Europe.
In the past, _B. suis_ was found worldwide in swine-raising regions.
This organism has been eradicated from domesticated pigs in the U.S.,
Canada, many European countries and other nations. However, it
persists in wild and/or feral swine populations in some areas,
including the U.S., Europe and Queensland, Australia. Sporadic
outbreaks are reported in domesticated herds or humans due to
transmission from this source. _B. suis_ continues to occur in
domesticated herds in some countries of South and Central America
(including Mexico) and Asia. _B. suis_ biovars 1 and 3 are found
worldwide, but other biovars have a limited geographic distribution.
Biovar 2 occurs in wild boar in much of Europe. Biovar 4 (rangiferine
brucellosis) is limited to the Arctic regions of North America and
Russia including Siberia, Canada and Alaska. Biovar 5 (murine
brucellosis) is found in the former USSR.
According to the OIE WAHID database, _Brucella suis_ has sporadically
caused outbreaks in Europe over the last 5 years. It has occurred
both in commercial and feral swine populations. Armenia had an
outbreak in 2008; Croatia has reported outbreaks yearly since 2006 as
has been the case for the Czech Republic. France reported outbreaks
of _B. suis_ in 2006, 2008, 2009; Germany reported outbreaks in 2008
and 2009 as well as this year. Hungary report outbreaks in 2008 and
2009. Italy reported outbreaks every year including 2010 since 2006.
Romania reported outbreak in 2006 and 2008; while the former Serbia
and Montenegro reported an outbreak in 2006. Finally, both Spain and
Switzerland reported outbreaks in 2009. - Mod.PC]
[see also:
Brucellosis, swine - Germany: (BB), OIE 20100213.0508
Brucellosis, swine hunters - USA (02): (TX) hunters 20090920.3303
2008
----
Brucellosis, porcine - Germany: (MV), serovar 2 20080923.2995
Brucellosis, porcine - Germany: (MV) 20080918.2927
Brucellosis, porcine - Romania: OIE 20081011.3220]
...................pc/ejp/lm
*##########################################################*
************************************************************
ProMED-mail makes every effort to verify the reports that
are posted, but the accuracy and completeness of the
information, and of any statements or opinions based
thereon, are not guaranteed. The reader assumes all risks in
using information posted or archived by ProMED-mail. ISID
and its associated service providers shall not be held
responsible for errors or omissions or held liable for any
damages incurred as a result of use or reliance upon posted
or archived material.
************************************************************
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Wednesday, September 15, 2010
DENGUE/DHF UPDATE 2010 (48)
***************************
A ProMED-mail post
ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases
http://www.isid.org/
In this update:
Europe
[1] France (Alpes-Maritimes)
Americas
[2] USA (Florida): correction
[3] Brazil (Roraima)
Asia
[4] Philippines (Cebu)
[5] India (Delhi)
******
[1] France (Alpes-Maritimes)
Date: Mon 13 Sep 2010
Source: French Ministry of Health and Sport [in French, trans. Mod.SC
& CopyEd. Laurence Mialot, edited]
http://www.sante-sports.gouv.fr/premier-cas-autochtone-isole-de-dengue-en-france-metropolitaine.html
The Ministry of Health and Sports confirmed the presence of the 1st
indigenous case of dengue fever in France, Nice (Alpes-Maritimes).
This is an isolated case and no further cases have been reported to
date. The patient is cured and healthy.
This is level 2 of the national anti-dengue dissemination plan in
France, which is coordinated by the Directorate General of Health and
whose implementation is local, in this case, the Regional Agency for
Health PACA, the Prefecture of Alpes-Maritimes, and local communities.
To prevent any further spread of the virus, the epidemiological
surveillance measures and entomological (that is to say mosquito)
will be strengthened. Mosquito control actions have been implemented
around the area of the residence of the person who was affected.
The risk of development of an epidemic is considered limited, but can
not be excluded, due to the significant presence of the tiger
mosquito [_Aedes albopictus_] locally. The Ministry of Health
therefore calls upon the individual and community mobilization and
calls for people residing in and around Nice to adopt a number of
measures to prevent any further spread of the virus:
- destroy the larvae and potential mosquito breeding habitat in and
around (removing saucers under flowerpots and empty at least once a
week all the containers of still water: garbage, gutters ...);
- protect yourself from mosquito bites by wearing long sleeve shirts
and long pants, using insect repellents (following the proper dosage,
especially for children and pregnant women) as well as mosquito nets
crib for newborns and infants.
- protect habitat (mosquito nets, electric diffusers. ...).
Dengue is transmitted from person to person, only through a bite of
the _Aedes_ mosquito. In the south of France the _Aedes albopictus_
(tiger mosquito) is present. During a bite, the mosquito takes the
virus on an infected person. After an incubation period in the
mosquito of up to a few days and [then] it can transmit the virus to
a healthy person after another bite. Individual measures of
protection against mosquito bites are essential to fight against the
development of an epidemic.
--
Communicated by:
HealthMap Alerts via ProMED-FRA
promed-fra@promedmail.com
[The occurrence of a locally-acquired dengue virus infection is not
surprising. _Aedes albopictus_ has become established in various
parts of the Mediterranean Basin, including Nice (see ProMED-mail
archive no. 20100731.2564). Many individuals have become infected
with dengue viruses acquired in endemic areas and become ill after
their return to France (see ProMED-mail archive no. 20100616.2008).
When a viremic individual is located in an area with _Aedes
albopictus_, there is a risk of ongoing infection similar to the
chikungunya outbreak that occurred in Italy in 2007 (see ProMED-mail
archive no. 20071210.3980).
A HealthMap/ProMED-mail interactive map of France showing the
location of Nice can be accessed at
. - Mod.TY]
******
[2] USA (Florida): correction
Date: Tue 14 Sep 2010
From: Danielle Stanek[edited]
We would like to provide a correction to the PAHO dengue alert
recently published in ProMED-mail that erroneously reported both
dengue 1 and dengue 3 virus circulation in Monroe County, Florida.
This is not the case; dengue 1 [virus] has been the only dengue
serovar detected in multiple samples collected in Monroe both in the
fall of 2009 and since re-emergence or re-introduction in March of
2010.
Dengue 3 serovar was identified by the Florida Department of Health
Bureau of Laboratories in a single patient from Broward County,
Florida several weeks ago (patient onset date was 1 Aug [2010]).
Since that time no further locally acquired cases have been
identified in Broward even following initiation of active
surveillance conducted by the Broward County Health Department.
Broward County does not directly border Monroe County.
We thank PAHO for quickly correcting their report and webpage once we
alerted them to the error. The Florida Department of Health Bureau of
Environmental Public Health Medicine weekly arbovirus surveillance
reports include all confirmed human and veterinary arbovirus cases as
well as positive results from sentinel chickens and may be viewed at
http://myfloridaeh.com/medicine/arboviral/Weekly-Summary.html
--
Communicated by:
Danielle Stanek, DVM
Medical Epidemiologist
Florida Department of Health
Bureau of Environmental Public Health Medicine
Zoonotic and Vector-borne Disease Program
4052 Bald Cypress Way, BIN A08
Tallahassee, FL 32399-1712
[ProMED-mail thanks Dr Stanek for bringing this correction to our
attention. The failure to detect ongoing dengue virus transmission of
dengue virus 3 in Broward County is good news, indeed.
A HealthMap/ProMED-mail interactive map showing Florida in the
southeast USA can be accessed at
.
Broward and Monroe counties in South Florida can be located on the map at
. - Mod.TY]
******
[3] Brazil (Roraima)
Date: Mon 13 Sep 2010
Source: O Globo [in Portuguese, trans. & summ. Mod.TY, edited]
Researchers in the Roraima Central Laboratory, the Roraima Federal
University, and the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (FIOCRUZ) confirmed that
the dengue virus serotype 4 circulating in the state came from
Venezuela and is the same one that circulated in the country 28 years
ago, according to the state Secretariat of Health. They compared
current [virus] samples with information from a world bank of
genomes. From that point the virus was identified as having come from
Venezuela, where the disease is common, and has not mutated since
1982.
The discovery of the origin of the virus will help Epidemiological
Surveillance in fighting dengue in the state. In Roraima, 3 cases of
dengue [virus] type 4 were confirmed with 4 new suspected [cases].
After 28 years, this virus has returned to Brazil. The majority of
Brazilians do not have immunity to [dengue] virus type 4, which
increases the chances of an epidemic. At the beginning of the month
[September 2010], the Minister of Health, Jose Gomes Temporao, stated
that the disease is contained in the state and that there is no
evidence that it will spread to other parts of the country.
--
Communicated by:
ProMED-PORT
[This is informative but not surprising. - Mod.LJS]
[A map showing the states in Brazil, with Roraima in the north, can be seen at
.
A HealthMap/ProMED-mail interactive map of Brazil can be accessed at
. - Mod.TY]
******
[4] Philippines (Cebu)
Date: Sun 12 Sep 2010
Source: Manila Bulletin Publishing Corporation [edited]
The mosquito-borne disease [virus] continues to wreak havoc in the
province, claiming at least 8 lives of children just this month
[September 2010], the Regional Epidemiology Surveillance Unit (RESU)
7 revealed late last week.
The latest fatalities expired midweek last week inside the Vicente
Sotto Memorial Medical Center (VSMMC), a RESU 7 personnel said. There
were at least 270 patients brought to the VSMMC during a one-week
period from 1 Sep [2010]; 5 of them died. These patients, whose ages
range from 9 months old to 35 years old are from the different parts
of Cebu, including Cebu City.
DoH 7 director Susana Madarieta said from January to September of
this year [2010], the region has recorded 5571 dengue cases or 1229
cases more compared to the same period of last year [2009].
With the number of dengue cases in Cebu and the rest of Central
Visayas rapidly increasing, local government officials and the DoH 7
are stepping up its measures against the mosquito-borne dengue
disease here.
Cebu City Medical Center (CCMC) has been jam packed with dengue
patients being brought in almost daily, prompting Cebu City mayor
Michael Rama to ask those from outside the city to go to other
hospitals so as not to drain the city's resources.
[Byline: Mars W Mosqueda Jr]
--
Communicated by:
HealthMap Alerts via ProMED-mail
[A map showing the provinces in the Philippines can be accessed at
.
A HealthMap/ProMED mail interactive map of the Philippines can be accessed at
. - Mod.TY]
******
[5] India (Delhi)
Date: Tue 14 Sep 2010
Source: India Talkies, Indo Asian News Service (IANS) report [summ., edited]
With 4 deaths and over 1800 infected by the mosquito-borne disease
[virus] here [in New Delhi], medical institutions have their hands
full. While the bigger hospitals are trying to cope by joining beds,
there are some where patients have little option other than the
floor. At Safdarjung Hospital, run by the government and one of the
biggest here, the rush of dengue patients has become difficult to
manage. Prathap Dutta, joint secretary of resident doctors
association, told IANS. As many as 150 patients, Dutta said, land up
at Safdarjung Hospital in a day. "We are running out of medicines,
intravenous fluids and saline drips," Dutta said.
The incessant rains lashing the city and the debris created by
construction for the upcoming Commonwealth Games are the main reasons
cited for the dengue outbreak in the capital. The Municipal
Corporation of Delhi (MCD) has confirmed 4 deaths from the disease.
Over 1836 dengue cases have been recorded so far in Delhi.
According to MCD, the number of dengue cases this year [2010] will
cross the 2006 figure of 3366 cases.
The corporation has found a high density of mosquito breeding in the
south and central areas of the city. So far, they have issued 45 532
notices to errant residents and housing societies.
[Byline: Prathiba Raju]
--
Communicated by:
HealthMap Alerts via ProMED-mail
[A HealthMap/ProMED-mail interactive map of India showing the
location of Delhi can be accessed at
. - Mod.TY]
[see also:
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (47) 20100913.3308
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (46) 20100906.3198
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (45) 20100830.3085
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (44) 20100826.3010
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (43) 20100819.2891
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (42) 20100817.2847
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (41) 20100810.2726
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (40) 20100805.2651
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (39) 20100804.2636
Chikungunya and dengue - France (02): risk 20100731.2564
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (38) 20100727.2520
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (37) 20100720.2435
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (36) 20100719.2429
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (35) 20100715.2372
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (34) 20100715.2368
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (33) 20100713.2342
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (32) 20100705.2240
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (31) 20100701.2196
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (30) 20100627.2152
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (29) 20100622.2085
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (28) 20100618.2043
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (27) 20100616.2009
Chikungunya and dengue - France ex overseas 20100616.2008
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (26) 20100607.1903
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (25) 20100601.1821
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (24) 20100524.1722
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (23) 20100517.1620
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (22) 20100510.1528
Dengue update 2010 (21) 20100503.1439
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (20) 20100426.1347
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (19) 20100420.1279
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (18) 20100412.1190
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (17) 20100405.1094
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (16) 20100329.0982
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (15) 20100323.0922
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (14) 20100322.0910
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (13) 20100316.0840
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (12) 20100315.0835
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (11) 20100308.0753
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (10) 20100304.0707
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (09) 20100302.0685
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (08) 20100222.0597
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (07) 20100216.0537
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (06) 20100208.0426
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (05) 20100201.0346
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (04) 20100125.0277
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (03) 20100119.0211
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (02) 20100111.0131
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (01) 20100104.0038]
...................................lm/ty/mj/lm
*##########################################################*
************************************************************
ProMED-mail makes every effort to verify the reports that
are posted, but the accuracy and completeness of the
information, and of any statements or opinions based
thereon, are not guaranteed. The reader assumes all risks in
using information posted or archived by ProMED-mail. ISID
and its associated service providers shall not be held
responsible for errors or omissions or held liable for any
damages incurred as a result of use or reliance upon posted
or archived material.
************************************************************
Donate to ProMED-mail. Details available at:
************************************************************
Visit ProMED-mail's web site at.
Send all items for posting to: promed@promedmail.org (NOT to
an individual moderator). If you do not give your full name
name and affiliation, it may not be posted. You may unsub-
scribe at.
For assistance from a human being, send mail to:
.
A ProMED-mail post
ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases
http://www.isid.org/
In this update:
Europe
[1] France (Alpes-Maritimes)
Americas
[2] USA (Florida): correction
[3] Brazil (Roraima)
Asia
[4] Philippines (Cebu)
[5] India (Delhi)
******
[1] France (Alpes-Maritimes)
Date: Mon 13 Sep 2010
Source: French Ministry of Health and Sport [in French, trans. Mod.SC
& CopyEd. Laurence Mialot, edited]
http://www.sante-sports.gouv.fr/premier-cas-autochtone-isole-de-dengue-en-france-metropolitaine.html
The Ministry of Health and Sports confirmed the presence of the 1st
indigenous case of dengue fever in France, Nice (Alpes-Maritimes).
This is an isolated case and no further cases have been reported to
date. The patient is cured and healthy.
This is level 2 of the national anti-dengue dissemination plan in
France, which is coordinated by the Directorate General of Health and
whose implementation is local, in this case, the Regional Agency for
Health PACA, the Prefecture of Alpes-Maritimes, and local communities.
To prevent any further spread of the virus, the epidemiological
surveillance measures and entomological (that is to say mosquito)
will be strengthened. Mosquito control actions have been implemented
around the area of the residence of the person who was affected.
The risk of development of an epidemic is considered limited, but can
not be excluded, due to the significant presence of the tiger
mosquito [_Aedes albopictus_] locally. The Ministry of Health
therefore calls upon the individual and community mobilization and
calls for people residing in and around Nice to adopt a number of
measures to prevent any further spread of the virus:
- destroy the larvae and potential mosquito breeding habitat in and
around (removing saucers under flowerpots and empty at least once a
week all the containers of still water: garbage, gutters ...);
- protect yourself from mosquito bites by wearing long sleeve shirts
and long pants, using insect repellents (following the proper dosage,
especially for children and pregnant women) as well as mosquito nets
crib for newborns and infants.
- protect habitat (mosquito nets, electric diffusers. ...).
Dengue is transmitted from person to person, only through a bite of
the _Aedes_ mosquito. In the south of France the _Aedes albopictus_
(tiger mosquito) is present. During a bite, the mosquito takes the
virus on an infected person. After an incubation period in the
mosquito of up to a few days and [then] it can transmit the virus to
a healthy person after another bite. Individual measures of
protection against mosquito bites are essential to fight against the
development of an epidemic.
--
Communicated by:
HealthMap Alerts via ProMED-FRA
promed-fra@promedmail.com
[The occurrence of a locally-acquired dengue virus infection is not
surprising. _Aedes albopictus_ has become established in various
parts of the Mediterranean Basin, including Nice (see ProMED-mail
archive no. 20100731.2564). Many individuals have become infected
with dengue viruses acquired in endemic areas and become ill after
their return to France (see ProMED-mail archive no. 20100616.2008).
When a viremic individual is located in an area with _Aedes
albopictus_, there is a risk of ongoing infection similar to the
chikungunya outbreak that occurred in Italy in 2007 (see ProMED-mail
archive no. 20071210.3980).
A HealthMap/ProMED-mail interactive map of France showing the
location of Nice can be accessed at
******
[2] USA (Florida): correction
Date: Tue 14 Sep 2010
From: Danielle Stanek
We would like to provide a correction to the PAHO dengue alert
recently published in ProMED-mail that erroneously reported both
dengue 1 and dengue 3 virus circulation in Monroe County, Florida.
This is not the case; dengue 1 [virus] has been the only dengue
serovar detected in multiple samples collected in Monroe both in the
fall of 2009 and since re-emergence or re-introduction in March of
2010.
Dengue 3 serovar was identified by the Florida Department of Health
Bureau of Laboratories in a single patient from Broward County,
Florida several weeks ago (patient onset date was 1 Aug [2010]).
Since that time no further locally acquired cases have been
identified in Broward even following initiation of active
surveillance conducted by the Broward County Health Department.
Broward County does not directly border Monroe County.
We thank PAHO for quickly correcting their report and webpage once we
alerted them to the error. The Florida Department of Health Bureau of
Environmental Public Health Medicine weekly arbovirus surveillance
reports include all confirmed human and veterinary arbovirus cases as
well as positive results from sentinel chickens and may be viewed at
http://myfloridaeh.com/medicine/arboviral/Weekly-Summary.html
--
Communicated by:
Danielle Stanek, DVM
Medical Epidemiologist
Florida Department of Health
Bureau of Environmental Public Health Medicine
Zoonotic and Vector-borne Disease Program
4052 Bald Cypress Way, BIN A08
Tallahassee, FL 32399-1712
[ProMED-mail thanks Dr Stanek for bringing this correction to our
attention. The failure to detect ongoing dengue virus transmission of
dengue virus 3 in Broward County is good news, indeed.
A HealthMap/ProMED-mail interactive map showing Florida in the
southeast USA can be accessed at
Broward and Monroe counties in South Florida can be located on the map at
******
[3] Brazil (Roraima)
Date: Mon 13 Sep 2010
Source: O Globo [in Portuguese, trans. & summ. Mod.TY, edited]
Researchers in the Roraima Central Laboratory, the Roraima Federal
University, and the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (FIOCRUZ) confirmed that
the dengue virus serotype 4 circulating in the state came from
Venezuela and is the same one that circulated in the country 28 years
ago, according to the state Secretariat of Health. They compared
current [virus] samples with information from a world bank of
genomes. From that point the virus was identified as having come from
Venezuela, where the disease is common, and has not mutated since
1982.
The discovery of the origin of the virus will help Epidemiological
Surveillance in fighting dengue in the state. In Roraima, 3 cases of
dengue [virus] type 4 were confirmed with 4 new suspected [cases].
After 28 years, this virus has returned to Brazil. The majority of
Brazilians do not have immunity to [dengue] virus type 4, which
increases the chances of an epidemic. At the beginning of the month
[September 2010], the Minister of Health, Jose Gomes Temporao, stated
that the disease is contained in the state and that there is no
evidence that it will spread to other parts of the country.
--
Communicated by:
ProMED-PORT
[This is informative but not surprising. - Mod.LJS]
[A map showing the states in Brazil, with Roraima in the north, can be seen at
A HealthMap/ProMED-mail interactive map of Brazil can be accessed at
******
[4] Philippines (Cebu)
Date: Sun 12 Sep 2010
Source: Manila Bulletin Publishing Corporation [edited]
The mosquito-borne disease [virus] continues to wreak havoc in the
province, claiming at least 8 lives of children just this month
[September 2010], the Regional Epidemiology Surveillance Unit (RESU)
7 revealed late last week.
The latest fatalities expired midweek last week inside the Vicente
Sotto Memorial Medical Center (VSMMC), a RESU 7 personnel said. There
were at least 270 patients brought to the VSMMC during a one-week
period from 1 Sep [2010]; 5 of them died. These patients, whose ages
range from 9 months old to 35 years old are from the different parts
of Cebu, including Cebu City.
DoH 7 director Susana Madarieta said from January to September of
this year [2010], the region has recorded 5571 dengue cases or 1229
cases more compared to the same period of last year [2009].
With the number of dengue cases in Cebu and the rest of Central
Visayas rapidly increasing, local government officials and the DoH 7
are stepping up its measures against the mosquito-borne dengue
disease here.
Cebu City Medical Center (CCMC) has been jam packed with dengue
patients being brought in almost daily, prompting Cebu City mayor
Michael Rama to ask those from outside the city to go to other
hospitals so as not to drain the city's resources.
[Byline: Mars W Mosqueda Jr]
--
Communicated by:
HealthMap Alerts via ProMED-mail
[A map showing the provinces in the Philippines can be accessed at
A HealthMap/ProMED mail interactive map of the Philippines can be accessed at
******
[5] India (Delhi)
Date: Tue 14 Sep 2010
Source: India Talkies, Indo Asian News Service (IANS) report [summ., edited]
With 4 deaths and over 1800 infected by the mosquito-borne disease
[virus] here [in New Delhi], medical institutions have their hands
full. While the bigger hospitals are trying to cope by joining beds,
there are some where patients have little option other than the
floor. At Safdarjung Hospital, run by the government and one of the
biggest here, the rush of dengue patients has become difficult to
manage. Prathap Dutta, joint secretary of resident doctors
association, told IANS. As many as 150 patients, Dutta said, land up
at Safdarjung Hospital in a day. "We are running out of medicines,
intravenous fluids and saline drips," Dutta said.
The incessant rains lashing the city and the debris created by
construction for the upcoming Commonwealth Games are the main reasons
cited for the dengue outbreak in the capital. The Municipal
Corporation of Delhi (MCD) has confirmed 4 deaths from the disease.
Over 1836 dengue cases have been recorded so far in Delhi.
According to MCD, the number of dengue cases this year [2010] will
cross the 2006 figure of 3366 cases.
The corporation has found a high density of mosquito breeding in the
south and central areas of the city. So far, they have issued 45 532
notices to errant residents and housing societies.
[Byline: Prathiba Raju]
--
Communicated by:
HealthMap Alerts via ProMED-mail
[A HealthMap/ProMED-mail interactive map of India showing the
location of Delhi can be accessed at
[see also:
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (47) 20100913.3308
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (46) 20100906.3198
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (45) 20100830.3085
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (44) 20100826.3010
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (43) 20100819.2891
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (42) 20100817.2847
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (41) 20100810.2726
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (40) 20100805.2651
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (39) 20100804.2636
Chikungunya and dengue - France (02): risk 20100731.2564
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (38) 20100727.2520
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (37) 20100720.2435
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (36) 20100719.2429
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (35) 20100715.2372
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (34) 20100715.2368
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (33) 20100713.2342
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (32) 20100705.2240
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (31) 20100701.2196
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (30) 20100627.2152
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (29) 20100622.2085
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (28) 20100618.2043
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (27) 20100616.2009
Chikungunya and dengue - France ex overseas 20100616.2008
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (26) 20100607.1903
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (25) 20100601.1821
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (24) 20100524.1722
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (23) 20100517.1620
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (22) 20100510.1528
Dengue update 2010 (21) 20100503.1439
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (20) 20100426.1347
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (19) 20100420.1279
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (18) 20100412.1190
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (17) 20100405.1094
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (16) 20100329.0982
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (15) 20100323.0922
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (14) 20100322.0910
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (13) 20100316.0840
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (12) 20100315.0835
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (11) 20100308.0753
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (10) 20100304.0707
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (09) 20100302.0685
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (08) 20100222.0597
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (07) 20100216.0537
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (06) 20100208.0426
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (05) 20100201.0346
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (04) 20100125.0277
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (03) 20100119.0211
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (02) 20100111.0131
Dengue/DHF update 2010 (01) 20100104.0038]
...................................lm/ty/mj/lm
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