Zoonotic Diseases

Diseases discussed here have a history of use as an agent for biological warfare, either in the U.S. or abroad. Its use may have been experimental or actual, and any detrimental consequences upon humans, animals or the environment may have been intentional or not, depending on the circumstances, the point in time, and the nature of the disease.

Sunday, February 21, 2010

MRSA in livestock animals -- an epidemic waiting to happen?

A ProMED-mail post

ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases


******
[1]
Date: June 2008
Source: Clinical Microbiology and Infection [edited]



MRSA in livestock animals -- an epidemic waiting to happen?
-----------------------------------------------------------
M. Wulf & A. Voss, Volume 14, Issue 6, Date: June 2008, Pages: 519-521

Abstract:
---------
Screening of pig farmers and pigs in The Netherlands has revealed that
more than 20 percent of pig farmers and 39 percent of slaughterhouse
pigs are positive for an unusual strain of methicillin-resistant
_Staphylococcus aureus_ (MRSA) belonging to sequence type (ST) 398. It
is now clear that the emergence of ST398 is not just a Dutch problem,
with human infections being described in several European countries,
Canada and Singapore. Furthermore, some human isolates have now
acquired the genes encoding Panton-Valentine leukocidin. Livestock may
become an important source of community-acquired MRSA. A concerted
effort on the part of clinicians, infection control practitioners and
veterinarians will be required to prevent further spread of this novel
strain of MRSA.

[See full text at:

(registration required)]

--
Communicated by:
Terry S. Singeltary Sr.


******
[2]
Date: July 2009
Source: EID [edited]



Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus ST398 in Swine Farm
Personnel, Belgium.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Oliver Dennis et al, EID Volume 15, Number 7-July 2009

Abstract:
---------
We assessed methicillin-resistant _Staphylococcus aureus_ (MRSA) in
persons on 49 swine farms in Belgium. Surveys showed that 48 (37.8
percent) persons carried MRSA ST398 and 1 (0.8 percent) had concurrent
skin infection. Risk factors for carriage were MRSA carriage by pigs,
regular contact with pigs and companion animals, and use of protective
clothing.

[snip...]

Conclusions:
------------
Human carriage of MRSA was associated with swine colonization with
MRSA. Prevalence rate (38 percent) was higher than that for
hospitalized patients or nursing home residents in Belgium
(). MRSA isolates from
farmers belonged to closely related spa types corresponding to ST398,
which are unrelated to hospital- and community-acquired strains but
identical to strains from humans in contact with pigs in other
European countries (1,2,10).

Despite the high prevalence of nasal MRSA, active MRSA skin infection
was detected infrequently (less than 1 percent), within the range
described in recent US-based studies (11). In a hospital in the
Netherlands, a lower attack rate was found for MRSA ST398 than for
other MRSA strains (12). However, invasive infections caused by MRSA
ST398 have been reported, suggesting that this genotype is pathogenic
for humans (2). In our study, MRSA strains did not harbor exotoxin.

Two MRSA genotypes were predominant. For 70 percent of farms with
multiple MRSA carriers, all strains belonged to the same genotype,
suggesting transmission within the farm. Although these strains have
been shown to not spread easily in hospitals (12), outbreaks of MRSA
ST398 in a residential care facility and a hospital probably
originated from health care workers living on pig farms (13,14). In
contrast with MRSA strains, MSSA [methicillin-susceptible]
_Staphylococcus aureus_ isolates in our study showed diverse genotypes
that frequently colonize human populations (4). MSSA isolates from 3
farmers belonged to the ST398 genotype, which is infrequently reported
in humans except in pig farmers with contact with pigs (4).

Risk factors for MRSA ST398 carriage included regular contact with
pigs but also with horses and dogs (10), suggesting that different
animals could be MRSA ST398 reservoirs or vectors, at least on pig
farms. Protective measures did not seem to reduce the risk of becoming
colonized with MRSA; this lack of effectiveness has previously been
observed for veterinarians (15). This apparent lack of protection
should be further investigated to determine routes of transmission
other than direct contact with pigs, including airborne transmission
and contact with contaminated surfaces and companion animals.

--
Communicated by:
Terry S. Singeltary Sr.


******
[3]
Date: 24 Feb 2010
Source: Veterinary Microbiology [edited]



Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus in horses and horse
personnel: An investigation of several outbreaks.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
E. van Duijkeren et al, Veterinary Microbiology Volume 141, Issues
1-2, 24 February 2010, Pages 96-102

Abstract:
---------
At the Veterinary Microbiological Diagnostic Center, the Netherlands,
the percentage of methicillin-resistant _Staphylococcus aureus_ (MRSA)
isolates found in equine clinical samples increased from 0 percent in
2002 to 37 percent in 2008. MRSA of spa-type t064, belonging to MLST
ST8 and spa-types t011 and t2123, both belonging to the
livestock-associated MLST ST398, predominated.

During an outbreak of post-surgical MRSA infections in horses at a
veterinary teaching hospital in 2006/2007, MRSA isolates of spa-type
t2123 were cultured from 7 horses and 4/61 personnel which indicated
zoonotic transmission. After intervention the outbreak stopped.
However, another outbreak occurred in 2008, where 17 equine MRSA
isolates of spa-type t011 (n = 12), t2123 (n = 4), and t064 (n = 1)
were found. This time, 16/170 personnel were positive for MRSA with
spa-type t011 (n = 11) and t2123 (n = 5). Personnel in close contact
with horses were more often MRSA-positive (15/106) than those without
(1/64).

Screening of horses upon admission showed that 9.3 percent were
MRSA-positive predominantly with spa-type t011. Weekly cross-sectional
sampling of all hospitalized horses for 5 weeks showed that 42 percent
of the horses were MRSA-positive at least once, again predominantly
with spa-type t011, which suggests that nosocomial transmission took
place. A total of 53 percent of the environmental samples were
MRSA-positive, including samples from students' and staff members'
rooms, and all were spa-type t011. This indicates that humans
contribute to spreading the organism. Culturing of samples employing
high-salt pre-enrichment performed better than a comparable method
without pre-enrichment.

Our results show that nosocomial transmission occurs in equine clinics
and suggests that personnel play a role in the transmission.

--
Communicated by:
Terry S. Singeltary Sr.


[Our thanks to Terry for finding these and other recent articles.
Obviously this is a [question of what is suitable for one situation
might be unsuitable for another], as far as different types of
antibiotics go or stay. - Mod.MHJ]

******
[4]
Date: 18 Feb 2010
From: Hurd, H. S [VDPAM]



RE: Antibiotic resistance & agricultural uses - USA (02)
--------------------------------------------------------
When considering MRSA it is important to categorize the data being
discussed on 2 axes: 1) route of human exposure; and 2) type of
infection/colonization. Confusing these items will lead to a
misrepresentation of the risk.

1) Route can include:
a) Direct Exposure to animals; e.g., What also may be called
"occupational exposure";
b) Foodborne; This is the classic route taken by pathogens such as
Salmonella or Campylobacter -- this route is very rare for MRSA;
c) Fomite contact; if MRSA is on the meat brought home, it may get
implanted into the human. According to the CDC, this is not a likely
route.

2) Type of infection/colonization:
a) Infection; this is usually observed with some signs of illness or
lesions -- maybe isolation of the organism from internal issues;
b) Colonization; this is represented by the ability to recover the
living organism from an individual with no clinical signs, i.e., no
harm done.

The papers [1 through 3] seem to be describing the direct route of
colonization, "occupational non-harmful colonization." Less than 1
percent had "infection" described. Evidence of "occupational
colonization" cannot be easily construed as major public health threat.

Note that very few cases of the farm (ST 398) types have been found in
non-farm related human illness

--
Scott Hurd
Iowa State University
VDPAM, VMRI Bld 4

[see also:
Antibiotic resistance & agricultural uses - USA 20100216.0552
2000
----
Antibiotic resistance & agricultural uses - USA (02) 20000511.0718
Antibiotic resistance & agricultural uses - USA 20000429.0649
Antibiotic resistance, surveillance - Europe 20000103.0003
1998
----
Antibiotic resistance trends - Europe 19990204.0170
Antibiotic resistance: Internet surveillance (02) 19981219.2407
Antibiotic resistance: Internet surveillance 19981216.2373
Antibiotic resistance, livestock - USA 19980807.1542
Antibiotic resistance, livestock - USA 19980805.1509]]
.....................jw/mhj/ejp/jw
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Wednesday, February 17, 2010

Antibiotics in Livestock Production cause Antibiotic Resistance in Humans

Wonder why we are all coming down with zootonic diseases? Click on title above for new report

Q Fever Out-Break / UPDATE

Q FEVER - NETHERLANDS (13): HUMAN, ANIMAL
*****************************************
A ProMED-mail post

ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases


[1] Ovine, caprine
[2] Human

******
[1] Ovine, caprine
Date: Tue 16 Feb 2010
Source: Agrarisch Dagblad [in Dutch, trans. Mod.AS, edited]



2nd dairy sheep plant with Q fever
----------------------------------
The Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority (VWA) announced that a
dairy sheep farm in Stolwijk, South Holland, has been declared Q-fever
infected. It is the 2nd dairy sheep plant declared infected in the
Netherlands [since 1 Oct 2009]. In January [2010], a dairy sheep farm
in Kraggenburg was found infected.

In addition, another dairy goat farm in Haren, North Brabant, has now
been declared infected. The current total number of Q-fever infected
farms found in the Netherlands [since 1 Oct 2009], is 73 [of which 71
are dairy goat farms].

--
Communicated by:
Sabine Zentis
Castleview Pedigree English Longhorns
Gut Laach
52385 Nideggen
Germany


******
[2] Human
Date: Thu 11 Feb 2010
Source: AgriHolland [in Dutch, trans. & summ. Mod.AS, edited]



11 new Q fever patients so far in 2010
--------------------------------------
According to the Dutch National Institute for Public Health and the
Environment (RIVM), 136 new human cases of Q fever have been reported
in the country during the current year [2010]. In 11 of the patients,
the onset of disease took place during 2010 and it is assumed that
they had been infected within the previous weeks. The dates of onset
of disease in the other patients are not known, but are considered to
have taken place during 2009 or even earlier. Many people report their
health complaints to their family doctors only now, following the
disease becoming a news item [eventually leading to serological
confirmation. The incubation period for acute Q fever in humans varies
from 2 to 48 days; the typical incubation period is approximately 2 to
3 weeks. Chronic Q fever can occur from months to years after
infection. - Mod.AS]

--
Communicated by:
ProMED-mail


[An epidemic curve graph, showing the number of reported Dutch Q fever
patients by week of onset for the period 1 Jan 2007-10 Feb 2010, is
available at
.
The cases are presented according to the relevant Community Health
Services (GGD): dark green - "Hart voor Brabant" (NE Brabant); medium
green - SE Brabant; light green - South Limburg; gray - others. The
annual total numbers - 2007: N=194, 2008: N=980, 2009: N=2267, 2010:
N=11.

According to a recent literature search, 53 lab-confirmed outbreaks of
Q fever in humans have been published during the years 1981-2007. The
following 6 countries experienced the largest number of confirmed
outbreaks: Germany (9), France (6), Australia (5), Canada (5), UK (5),
USA (5). The remaining 18 outbreaks were reported from various parts
of the globe. In 26 of the 53 outbreaks, sheep were regarded as source
of infection; goats in 6. Among the other animal sources, cats were
suspected in 3 smaller outbreaks. Larger outbreaks were reported from
East European countries, but lab confirmation was not available.

_C. burnetii_ can infect many species of domestic animals and
wildlife; in many species, the infection appears to be asymptomatic.
Its reservoirs may be only partially known. Sheep, goats, and cattle
seem to be the most common domesticat animal reservoirs. Wild rodents
may be important reservoirs in some areas, and cats -- particularly
following parturition -- are suspected in urban outbreaks. _C.
burnetii_ has also been isolated from dogs, rabbits, horses, pigs,
camels, buffalo, deer, pigeons, swallows, parrots, crows, geese, and
other mammals and birds. Antibodies have been found in coyotes,
raccoons, opossums, badgers, jackrabbits, black bears, musk oxen and
other species. There are also reports of _C. burnetii_ in fish and
snakes. - Mod.AS]

[Maps of the Netherlands are available at
and
. - Sr.Tech.Ed.MJ]

[see also:
Q fever - Netherlands (12): 3 new outbreaks 20100213.0513
Q fever - Netherlands (11): culling dispute 20100206.0407
Q fever - Netherlands (10): international response 20100204.0380
Q fever - Netherlands (09): zoo-sanitary measures 20100128.0307
Q fever - Netherlands (08): sheep, update 20100125.0278
Q fever - Netherlands (07): update 20100115.0182
Q fever - Netherlands (06): OIE 20100115.0181
Q fever - Netherlands (05): investigation committee 20100112.0144
Q fever - Netherlands (04): culling 20100111.0119
Q fever - Netherlands (03): update 20100107.0079
Q fever - Netherlands (02): update 20100105.0047
Q fever - Netherlands: monitoring 20100103.0028
2009
----
Q fever - Netherlands (19): update 20091229.4375
Q fever - Netherlands (18): update 20091225.4334
Q fever - Netherlands (17): pathogenicity, RFI 20091222.4312
Q fever - Netherlands (16): pathogenicity, RFI 20091222.4304
Q fever - Netherlands (15): update 20091219.4286
Q fever - Netherlands (14): update 20091217.4271
Q fever, animals - Belgium: RFI 20091213.4234
Q fever - Netherlands (13): control measures 20091209.4198
Q fever - Netherlands (12): update 20091207.4173
Q fever - Netherlands (11): public health 20091113.3930
Q fever - Netherlands (10): update 20091107.3861
Q fever - Netherlands (09): predictions 20091004.3452
Q fever - Netherlands (08): update, monitoring & animal vaccination
20090927.3380
Q fever - Netherlands (07) 20090908.3169
Q fever - Netherlands (06) 20090814.2889
Q fever - Netherlands (05) 20090629.2355
Q fever - Netherlands (04): fatalities 20090626.2330
Q Fever - Netherlands (03): update, animal vaccination 20090510.1744
Q Fever - Netherlands (02): (NB) 20090508.1721
Q fever, caprine - Netherlands: (LI) 20090331.1230
Q fever - Netherlands: sheep & goat vaccination 20090228.0841
2008
----
Q fever - Netherlands (04): sheep & goat vaccination 20081023.3352
Q fever - Netherlands (03): (NBR, GEL) 20080802.2367
Q fever - Netherlands (02): (NBR) 20080728.2306
Q fever - Netherlands: (NBR) 20080725.2267
2007
----
Q fever - Netherlands (Noord-Brabant, Gelderland) 20070809.2592]
.........................................arn/mj/jw
*##########################################################*
************************************************************
ProMED-mail makes every effort to verify the reports that
are posted, but the accuracy and completeness of the
information, and of any statements or opinions based
thereon, are not guaranteed. The reader assumes all risks in
using information posted or archived by ProMED-mail. ISID
and its associated service providers shall not be held
responsible for errors or omissions or held liable for any
damages incurred as a result of use or reliance upon posted
or archived material.
************************************************************
Donate to ProMED-mail. Details available at:

************************************************************
Visit ProMED-mail's web site at .
Send all items for posting to: promed@promedmail.org
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Thursday, February 11, 2010

CJD in USA

Four (4) Die of CJD in NY;
http://www.rense.com/general58/cluster.htm

Two in Michigan Die of CJD;
http://www.prwatch.org/node/1161

Five (5) CJD Deaths in NJ;
http://www.organicconsumers.org/madcow/nj42404.cfm

During 1979 through 2006, an estimated 6,917 deaths with CJD as a cause of death were reported in the United States, an annual average of approximately 247 deaths (range 172-304 deaths); Click on title above to see report;


http://memory.ucsf.edu/cjd/news/human-prion-diseases-in-the-United-States

Prion Disease School

There are many forms of prion diseases, CJD vCJD are only a few. One thing they have in common is that the causes are unknown, only suspected.

CJD has been around for a long time. vCJD is a more recent "mutation" that effects younger folk.

The funny thing with malformed, malfunctioning prions is that they change slightly with each new host they effect. From all indications, not only do they mutate differently from species to species, but also from individuals and person to person too, depending on a number of factors.

The first CJD malformed prion was discovered in a scrapie sheep.

Click on title above to go to the prion disease center where you can learn more about it and watch an hour long vid

http://www.neuroprion.org/en/DVD-2007-medium.html

Wednesday, February 10, 2010

Zoonotic Diseases 101

Click on title above for wikipedia definition

Monday, February 8, 2010

Sunday, February 7, 2010

Defining a Farm

Click on title above for article

Food Animals Fed Antibiotics Making U.S. Immune




to antibiotics, not disease.

Broiler Producers Search for Alternatives to Antibiotics

James MacDonald
Sun Ling Wang

Antibiotics are widely used in modern livestock and poultry production to treat sick animals, but they are also administered in subtherapeutic doses to protect animals against disease and to promote growth. While the routine use of subtherapeutic antibiotics (STAs) can increase productivity, health officials, physicians, and veterinarians are concerned that extensive use is reducing the efficacy of antibiotics in treating human and animal diseases.

Widespread use of human and animal antibiotics can encourage the growth of drug-resistant pathogens. In agriculture, increased resistance to animal antibiotics can lead to more severe outbreaks of livestock disease. Resistant bacteria may cause disease directly, or they may pass genetic material associated with resistance on to other bacteria. In such cases, the widespread use of antibiotics, including STAs in animals, could help promote the development of drug-resistant bacteria that could pass from animals to humans, thus posing a danger to human health. In response to rising concerns, the European Union has banned STAs, and several major U.S. retailers and processors have moved to limit their use by input suppliers.

Recent ERS research summarizing the use of STAs in broiler chicken production draws on data from a large-scale survey of broiler producers (USDA’s 2006 Agricultural Resource Management Survey). Based on responses from over 1,500 producers of broilers for meat, STA use was not ubiquitous—42 percent of producers, representing 44 percent of production, did not use STAs in production in 2006 (this decision is actually made by the integrator that contracts with the farm).

Producers that did not use STAs relied instead on a portfolio of other practices to prevent disease and promote growth in broilers. About 75 percent of these producers had formal Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) plans, a systematic approach to identify and prevent food safety hazards. In comparison, only 43 percent of the farms that used STAs had an HACCP plan in place. Producers that did not use STAs relied on different feeding routines than STA users, and their facilities were characterized by more rigorous sanitation practices, improved ventilation for poultry housing, and more extensive testing for pathogens.

These practices can limit the growth of pathogens and detect their spread early while limiting their resistance to antibiotics. Because these practices have been widely adopted on farms in many locations and sizes, they appear to be commercially viable, providing many of the benefits of STA use but without the risks.

Click on title above for article w/ vid;

http://www.ers.usda.gov/AmberWaves/December09/Findings/BroilerProducers.htm

The swine flu crisis lays bare the meat industry's monstrous power

Smithfield at Bottom of Swine-Flu Outbreak?

http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/apr/27/swine-flu-mexico-health

National Meat Institution & National Hot Dog & Sausage Council Release Super-Bowl Recipies

Click on title above to see

U.S.Imports Beef

U.S. cattle imports from Canada:

2002: 1.686 million head
2003: 0.512 million head
2004: 135 head
2005: 0.559 million head
2006: 1.032 million head
2007: 1.405 million head
2008: 1.581 million head

U.S. cattle imports from all sources:

2002: 2.503 million head
2003: 1.752 million head
2004: 1.371 million head
2005: 1.816 million head
2006: 2.289 million head
2007: 2.495 million head
2008: 2.284 million head
Share of U.S. cattle imports from Canada:

2002: 67 percent
2003: 29 percent
2004: <0.1 percent
2005: 31 percent
2006: 45 percent
2007: 56 percent
2008: 65 percent

Beef and veal imports from Canada (carcass weight):

2002: 1.091 billion pounds
2003: 0.740 billion pounds
2004: 1.062 billion pounds
2005: 1.092 billion pounds
2006: 0.844 billion pounds
2007: 0.789 billion pounds
2008: 0.841 billion pounds

Beef and veal imports from all sources (carcass weight):

2002: 3.218 billion pounds
2003: 3.006 billion pounds
2004: 3.679 billion pounds
2005: 3.599 billion pounds
2006: 3.085 billion pounds
2007: 3.052 billion pounds
2008: 2.537 billion pounds

Beef import share from Canada:

2002: 34 percent
2003: 25 percent
2004: 29 percent
2005: 30 percent
2006: 27 percent
2007: 26 percent
2008: 33 percent

Beef imports from Canada as share of U.S. beef consumption:

2002: 3.9 percent
2003: 2.7 percent
2004: 3.8 percent
2005: 3.9 percent
2006: 3.0 percent
2007: 2.8 percent
2008: 3.1 percent

Canadian beef markets: U.S., Mexico, Japan, Korea, and other countries.

Value of all Canadian beef/cattle exports (Canadian dollars):

2002
$1.832 billion in live animals
$2.166 billion in beef products
$3.998 billion total sales

2003
$1.518 billion in live animals
$0.592 billion in beef products
$2.110 billion in total sales

2004
$2.015 billion in live animals
$0 in beef products
$2.015 billion in total sales

2005
$0.628 million in live animals
$1.886 billion in beef products
$2.514 billion in total sales

2006
$1.189 billion in live animals
$1.357 billion in beef products
$2.545 billion in total sales


2007
$1.545 billion in live animals
$1.228 billion in beef products
$2.773 billion in total sales


2008
$1.646 billion in live animals
$1.220 billion in beef products
$2.866 billion in total sales
**Note: Some products imported from Canada could be made from animals exported originally from the U.S. In addition, cattle shipments from Canada to the U.S. may include animals transshipped through Canada from Hawaii or Alaska.



http://www.ers.usda.gov/news/bsecoverage.htm

Saturday, February 6, 2010

FSIS: Humane Handling at all Entrances and the 28 hr Rule

Click on title above to see USDA memo on new regs

Bovine TB Spreads to Big-Horn Sheep

PNEUMONIA, OVINE - USA (05): (MONTANA) BIGHORN SHEEP
****************************************************
A ProMED-mail post

ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases


Date: Tue 2 Feb 2010
Source: The Missoulian [edited]



Deadly pneumonia infections have appeared in a 4th herd of bighorn
sheep this winter.

The latest outbreak was spotted over the weekend in Upper Rock Creek,
in a herd about 12 miles south of the also-infected Lower Rock Creek
herd.

Montana Fish, Wildlife and Parks biologist Ray Vinkey said he killed 3
Upper Rock Creek bighorns on Saturday [30 Jan 2010] and all had the
highly infectious disease. That's in addition to the 6 infected sheep
he took last week in the lower part of the drainage.

The 2 herds are separated by deep canyons and thick timber. Although
there hasn't been much genetic study or radio-collar work, biologists
have found little evidence that the 2 herds mingle. That leaves the
cause of the pneumonia spread a mystery.

"We still don't have a bigger picture," FWP Region 2 wildlife manager
Mike Thompson said on Monday [1 Feb 2010]. There are theories about
rams wandering from herd to herd or some stress-related factor
triggering the outbreaks, but no hard evidence has surfaced yet.

The Rock Creek sheep are at least 20 air miles from bighorn herds in
Bonner and Darby, where pneumonia has run through the respective
populations. FWP hunters culled 88 sheep from the Bonner herd above
West Riverside as of Monday [1 Feb 2010], and took 77 sheep from the
East Fork of the Bitterroot south of Darby last November [2009].

The goal was to kill infected sheep before they could pass the disease
to healthy bands. Bighorn pneumonia kills 70 percent to 90 percent of
its victims within a few weeks, and there is no effective vaccine or
treatment for it in the wild. Preliminary surveys of the East Fork
herd found 71 healthy sheep in the area after the cull there.

Vinkey said a similar cull may take place in the Upper Rock Creek
herd. Those sheep live in relatively accessible terrain. He planned to
make an aerial survey of the area later this week to determine how
widespread the outbreak is within the roughly 360-animal herd.

FWP will kill at least 10 to 20 diseased sheep in Upper Rock Creek for
analysis to identify the disease organism, and investigate whether the
4 pneumonia outbreaks might be related, he said.

A report from an interested citizen who volunteered to watch the sheep
for FWP last week, resulted in the 1st detection. A local rancher
helped Vinkey kill 2 ewes and a young ram on Saturday [30 Jan 2010],
and perform the necropsies that confirmed pneumonia is present.

"Reports from the public were responsible for the 1st detections of
pneumonia in all 4 recent outbreaks," said Vivaca Crowser, regional
information manager. "These reports from the public give us the chance
of detecting the disease in its early stages, and we need the public's
help to alert us to any possible outbreaks in other herds."

The Upper Rock Creek bighorn herd is a native population that was
supplemented by the addition of 31 sheep (21 ewes, 10 rams) from Sun
River in 1975. That herd was over its population objective and plans
were under way to capture up to 40 of its members for transplanting to
Utah in the next 2 months. The disease outbreak scrapped those plans,
Vinkey said.

The 200-animal herd in Lower Rock Creek lives in much steeper and
rocky hillsides, and probably can't be culled successfully.

Pneumonia does not appear to have reached large herds in the Anaconda
area 20 miles [32 km] east of Rock Creek or the Skalkaho Pass area 18
miles [29 km] to the southwest. Both of those areas have tough terrain
dividing the sheep habitats.

[Byline: Rob Chaney]

--
Communicated by:
ProMED-mail


[It has been suggested that an autogenous vaccine could be made.
Likely the vaccine would have to be made for oral consumption as
rounding these animals up might be quite difficult on man and animal.
However, it seems the tool of technology may not be applied as much as
the reliance on culling because it has always been done that way.
ProMED-mail would be grateful if someone involved in the situation
could give us an update of the technology that has been considered and
why it has been rejected.

For more information on the pneumonia affecting the bighorn sheep,
readers are encouraged to read the moderator's comments on ProMED-mail
post 20091126.4055.

Photos of bighorn sheep may be found at
.

The state of Montana in the Western United States can be seen on the
HealthMap/ProMED-mail interactive map at
- Mod.TG]

[Would any knowledgeable reader care to speculate on how a supposedly
ovine-specific peneumonia could spread up to 20 miles between herds
separated by supposedly impassable terrain? My bet is it would have
tp be by birds -- but what avian species interact with bighorns?
Tick-birds? - Mod.JW]

[see also:
Pneumonia, ovine - USA (04): (MT), bighorn sheep 20100124.0272
Pneumonia, ovine - USA (03): (MT), bighorn sheep 20100124.0262
Pneumonia, ovine - USA (02): (MT), bighorn sheep 20100117.0197
Pneumonia, ovine - USA: (NV) bighorn sheep 20100109.0105
2009
----
Pneumonia, bighorn sheep - USA (02): (MT) 20091203.4129
Pneumonia, bighorn sheep - USA: (MT) 20091126.4055]
........................................sb/tg/mj/jw
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Q FEVER - NETHERLANDS (11): CULLING DISPUTE

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A ProMED-mail post

ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases


******
[1]
Date: Fri 05 Feb 2010
Source: The Dutch News [edited]



Goat cull halted after Q fever test problems
--------------------------------------------
The slaughter of hundreds of goats on an intensive goat farm in
Limburg was halted following a court order on Friday [5 Feb 2010]
because test results for Q fever were inconclusive. It is the 1st time
a court has stopped the cull procedure, which covers all pregnant
goats on farms where Q fever has been found.

The farm owner applied for an injunction to head off the cull after
tests for the disease came up with conflicting results. He wants vets
to take new samples and have them tested in different laboratories to
find out if his herd really is carrying Q fever.

The judge will explain his ruling on Monday, news agency ANP reported.

--
Communicated by:
ProMED-mail


******
[2]
Date: Fri 5 Feb 2010
Source: Agrarisch Dagblad [trans. Mod.AS, edited]



LTO: Different view on the value of bulk milk testing results
-------------------------------------------------------------
LTO Netherlands [the Dutch Federation of Agriculture and Horticulture,
an entrepreneurial and employers' organisation] wishes the declaration
of a farm as Q fever infected, based upon a single positive test, to
be cancelled.

The milk tanks of goat and sheep dairy farms are sampled and tested
every 2 weeks. It occurs that plants are found repeatedly negative,
but following a single positive test they are culled. According LTO
Netherlands, there have been more cases similar to the one in Belfeld.
In those cases, a single positive test led to culling. In the current
case, the court denied the killing of the animals.

According to the spokesman of Minister Gerda Verburg [Agriculture],
LTO is also aware that 2 milk samplings undergo 3 tests. In the
Belfeld case, the owner requested an additional test of the goats'
milk; according to the Ministry, this complementary test did not
produce unequivocal results. This was the background to Friday's court
decision to suspend the culling, requesting additional investigation.
The plant is still officially declared infected.

Toon van Hoof, the holder of the animal health portfolio in LTO,
believes that experts should come forward with a proposal addressing
the variation in the results of the so-called bulk milk tests.

--
Communicated by:
ProMED-mail


[The application of PCR for the identification of _Coxiella burnetii_
infection in milk from dairy animals was initially published in the
early 90's, addressing cow's milk. Later, it was applied in testing of
bulk milk samples and in other species.

According to a 2005 paper (Ref 1), 316 bulk tank milk samples from
dairy herds in the United States were PCR-tested during a 3-year
period (from January 2001 to December 2003) by using trans-PCR.
Positive results were confirmed by nested PCR and DNA sequencing. The
overall prevalence of _C. burnetii_ in the tested samples was 94.3
percent with little variation (93.2 to 94.7 percent) from year to
year. Samples from New York State did not show significant variation
from other states, which indicated, according to the authors, that _C.
burnetii_ infection in the dairy herds was persistent or steady, with
little temporal or regional variations, suggesting that _C. burnetii_
infections in dairy herds "are common throughout the United States."

Throughout the recent decade, PCR was applied in the detection of _C.
burnetii_ in milk of small ruminants (sheep and goats) in several
countries, including bulk milk samples (see Ref 2). Its application in
the Netherlands, within a "test and slaughter" policy, is -- to the
best knowledge of this moderator -- unique.

According to the Dutch daily De Telegraaf, the dairy goat operation in
Belfeld includes 2700 animals; the newspaper does not disclose how
many of them are pregnant, to be culled in line with the current policy.

References
----------
1. Kim SG, Kim EH, Lafferty CJ, Dubovi E. (2005). _Coxiella burnetii_
in bulk tank milk samples, United States. Emerg Infect Dis. ;11: Vol.
11, No. 4, April 2005 619 - 621.


2. A. Rodolakis, M. Berri, C. He'chard, C. Caudron, A. Souriau, C. C.
Bodier, B. Blanchard, P. Camuset, P. Devillechaise, J. C. Natorp, J.
P. Vadet, and N. Arricau-Bouvery (2007). Comparison of _Coxiella
burnetii_ Shedding in Milk of Dairy Bovine, Caprine, and Ovine Herds.
J. Dairy Sci. 90:5352­5360.
.
- Mod.AS]

[see also:
Q fever - Netherlands (10): international response 20100204.0380
Q fever - Netherlands (09): zoo-sanitary measures 20100128.0307
Q fever - Netherlands (08): sheep, update 20100125.0278
Q fever - Netherlands (07): update 20100115.0182
Q fever - Netherlands (06): OIE 20100115.0181
Q fever - Netherlands (05): investigation committee 20100112.0144
Q fever - Netherlands (04): culling 20100111.0119
Q fever - Netherlands (03): update 20100107.0079
Q fever - Netherlands (02): update 20100105.0047
Q fever - Netherlands: monitoring 20100103.0028
2009
----
Q fever - Netherlands (19): update 20091229.4375
Q fever - Netherlands (18): update 20091225.4334
Q fever - Netherlands (17): pathogenicity, RFI 20091222.4312
Q fever - Netherlands (16): pathogenicity, RFI 20091222.4304
Q fever - Netherlands (15): update 20091219.4286
Q fever - Netherlands (14): update 20091217.4271
Q fever, animals - Belgium: RFI 20091213.4234
Q fever - Netherlands (13): control measures 20091209.4198
Q fever - Netherlands (12): update 20091207.4173
Q fever - Netherlands (11): public health 20091113.3930
Q fever - Netherlands (10): update 20091107.3861
Q fever - Netherlands (09): predictions 20091004.3452
Q fever - Netherlands (08): update, monitoring & animal vaccination
20090927.3380
Q fever - Netherlands (07) 20090908.3169
Q fever - Netherlands (06) 20090814.2889
Q fever - Netherlands (05) 20090629.2355
Q fever - Netherlands (04): fatalities 20090626.2330
Q Fever - Netherlands (03): update, animal vaccination 20090510.1744
Q Fever - Netherlands (02): (NB) 20090508.1721
Q fever, caprine - Netherlands: (LI) 20090331.1230
Q fever - Netherlands: sheep & goat vaccination 20090228.0841
2008
----
Q fever - Netherlands (04): sheep & goat vaccination 20081023.3352
Q fever - Netherlands (03): (NBR, GEL) 20080802.2367
Q fever - Netherlands (02): (NBR) 20080728.2306
Q fever - Netherlands: (NBR) 20080725.2267
2007
----
Q fever - Netherlands (Noord-Brabant, Gelderland) 20070809.2592]
....................arn/ejp/jw
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and its associated service providers shall not be held
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or archived material.
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