Local bill set to ban arsenic in chicken feed
//18 Mar 2010
Bills filed in the House and Senate of the state of Maryland would ban the use, sale and distribution of any commercial poultry feed with additives that contain arsenic.
This week, the Senate Education, Health and Environmental Affairs committee heard the testimony on its version of the bill.
Attorney General Douglas Gansler wrote an opinion column in the Washington Post in June arguing the Food and Drug Administration should ban arsenic from chicken feed. This week he said a ban in Maryland would benefit the poultry industry and the environment.
Accoridng to Bill Satterfield, executive director of poultry trade organisation Delmarva Poultry Industry Inc., Roxarsone, a widely used feed additive that contains arsenic, is "a tool to improve bird health and welfare". Banning the use of roxarsone would put Maryland chicken growers and feed producers at an economic disadvantage, and result in "a lot more sick birds, a lot more dead birds".
Essential tool
Elizabeth Krushinskie, a veterinarian who serves as director of quality assurance and food safety at Mountaire Farms in Delaware, called roxarsone an "essential and critical tool".
But not all poultry farmers use roxarsone. Perdue stopped using additives that contain arsenic about three years ago, said spokesman Luis Luna.
Improve management
The Salisbury-based company chooses not to use the additive because it has "worked hard to have an approach to bird health that works without the use of arsenic. [...] that's good animal husbandry and best management practices that produced that result," Luna said.
Still, Perdue does not support the bill, Luna said, adding that the science doesn’t support a ban right now. "It isn’t clear... If people believe it’s a safety issue, then they can take it up with the FDA. Right now, it’s about emotion and sloganeering, which creates confusion, and not about a review of the science, which is what we trust the FDA to do.”
Arsenic occurs naturally in the environment, but it has been linked to cancer and other negative health effects, according to the Environmental Protection Agency.
http://www.worldpoultry.net/news/local-bill-set-to-ban-arsenic-in-chicken-feed-7229.html
THE NEW ZOOnotic REVIEW: Tracking Diseases Shared Between Humans and Animals and Tracing Their Use as Biological Weapons, Past, Present and Future
Friday, March 19, 2010
Sunday, February 21, 2010
MRSA in livestock animals -- an epidemic waiting to happen?
A ProMED-mail post
ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases
******
[1]
Date: June 2008
Source: Clinical Microbiology and Infection [edited]
MRSA in livestock animals -- an epidemic waiting to happen?
-----------------------------------------------------------
M. Wulf & A. Voss, Volume 14, Issue 6, Date: June 2008, Pages: 519-521
Abstract:
---------
Screening of pig farmers and pigs in The Netherlands has revealed that
more than 20 percent of pig farmers and 39 percent of slaughterhouse
pigs are positive for an unusual strain of methicillin-resistant
_Staphylococcus aureus_ (MRSA) belonging to sequence type (ST) 398. It
is now clear that the emergence of ST398 is not just a Dutch problem,
with human infections being described in several European countries,
Canada and Singapore. Furthermore, some human isolates have now
acquired the genes encoding Panton-Valentine leukocidin. Livestock may
become an important source of community-acquired MRSA. A concerted
effort on the part of clinicians, infection control practitioners and
veterinarians will be required to prevent further spread of this novel
strain of MRSA.
[See full text at:
(registration required)]
--
Communicated by:
Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
******
[2]
Date: July 2009
Source: EID [edited]
Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus ST398 in Swine Farm
Personnel, Belgium.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Oliver Dennis et al, EID Volume 15, Number 7-July 2009
Abstract:
---------
We assessed methicillin-resistant _Staphylococcus aureus_ (MRSA) in
persons on 49 swine farms in Belgium. Surveys showed that 48 (37.8
percent) persons carried MRSA ST398 and 1 (0.8 percent) had concurrent
skin infection. Risk factors for carriage were MRSA carriage by pigs,
regular contact with pigs and companion animals, and use of protective
clothing.
[snip...]
Conclusions:
------------
Human carriage of MRSA was associated with swine colonization with
MRSA. Prevalence rate (38 percent) was higher than that for
hospitalized patients or nursing home residents in Belgium
(). MRSA isolates from
farmers belonged to closely related spa types corresponding to ST398,
which are unrelated to hospital- and community-acquired strains but
identical to strains from humans in contact with pigs in other
European countries (1,2,10).
Despite the high prevalence of nasal MRSA, active MRSA skin infection
was detected infrequently (less than 1 percent), within the range
described in recent US-based studies (11). In a hospital in the
Netherlands, a lower attack rate was found for MRSA ST398 than for
other MRSA strains (12). However, invasive infections caused by MRSA
ST398 have been reported, suggesting that this genotype is pathogenic
for humans (2). In our study, MRSA strains did not harbor exotoxin.
Two MRSA genotypes were predominant. For 70 percent of farms with
multiple MRSA carriers, all strains belonged to the same genotype,
suggesting transmission within the farm. Although these strains have
been shown to not spread easily in hospitals (12), outbreaks of MRSA
ST398 in a residential care facility and a hospital probably
originated from health care workers living on pig farms (13,14). In
contrast with MRSA strains, MSSA [methicillin-susceptible]
_Staphylococcus aureus_ isolates in our study showed diverse genotypes
that frequently colonize human populations (4). MSSA isolates from 3
farmers belonged to the ST398 genotype, which is infrequently reported
in humans except in pig farmers with contact with pigs (4).
Risk factors for MRSA ST398 carriage included regular contact with
pigs but also with horses and dogs (10), suggesting that different
animals could be MRSA ST398 reservoirs or vectors, at least on pig
farms. Protective measures did not seem to reduce the risk of becoming
colonized with MRSA; this lack of effectiveness has previously been
observed for veterinarians (15). This apparent lack of protection
should be further investigated to determine routes of transmission
other than direct contact with pigs, including airborne transmission
and contact with contaminated surfaces and companion animals.
--
Communicated by:
Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
******
[3]
Date: 24 Feb 2010
Source: Veterinary Microbiology [edited]
Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus in horses and horse
personnel: An investigation of several outbreaks.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
E. van Duijkeren et al, Veterinary Microbiology Volume 141, Issues
1-2, 24 February 2010, Pages 96-102
Abstract:
---------
At the Veterinary Microbiological Diagnostic Center, the Netherlands,
the percentage of methicillin-resistant _Staphylococcus aureus_ (MRSA)
isolates found in equine clinical samples increased from 0 percent in
2002 to 37 percent in 2008. MRSA of spa-type t064, belonging to MLST
ST8 and spa-types t011 and t2123, both belonging to the
livestock-associated MLST ST398, predominated.
During an outbreak of post-surgical MRSA infections in horses at a
veterinary teaching hospital in 2006/2007, MRSA isolates of spa-type
t2123 were cultured from 7 horses and 4/61 personnel which indicated
zoonotic transmission. After intervention the outbreak stopped.
However, another outbreak occurred in 2008, where 17 equine MRSA
isolates of spa-type t011 (n = 12), t2123 (n = 4), and t064 (n = 1)
were found. This time, 16/170 personnel were positive for MRSA with
spa-type t011 (n = 11) and t2123 (n = 5). Personnel in close contact
with horses were more often MRSA-positive (15/106) than those without
(1/64).
Screening of horses upon admission showed that 9.3 percent were
MRSA-positive predominantly with spa-type t011. Weekly cross-sectional
sampling of all hospitalized horses for 5 weeks showed that 42 percent
of the horses were MRSA-positive at least once, again predominantly
with spa-type t011, which suggests that nosocomial transmission took
place. A total of 53 percent of the environmental samples were
MRSA-positive, including samples from students' and staff members'
rooms, and all were spa-type t011. This indicates that humans
contribute to spreading the organism. Culturing of samples employing
high-salt pre-enrichment performed better than a comparable method
without pre-enrichment.
Our results show that nosocomial transmission occurs in equine clinics
and suggests that personnel play a role in the transmission.
--
Communicated by:
Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
[Our thanks to Terry for finding these and other recent articles.
Obviously this is a [question of what is suitable for one situation
might be unsuitable for another], as far as different types of
antibiotics go or stay. - Mod.MHJ]
******
[4]
Date: 18 Feb 2010
From: Hurd, H. S [VDPAM]
RE: Antibiotic resistance & agricultural uses - USA (02)
--------------------------------------------------------
When considering MRSA it is important to categorize the data being
discussed on 2 axes: 1) route of human exposure; and 2) type of
infection/colonization. Confusing these items will lead to a
misrepresentation of the risk.
1) Route can include:
a) Direct Exposure to animals; e.g., What also may be called
"occupational exposure";
b) Foodborne; This is the classic route taken by pathogens such as
Salmonella or Campylobacter -- this route is very rare for MRSA;
c) Fomite contact; if MRSA is on the meat brought home, it may get
implanted into the human. According to the CDC, this is not a likely
route.
2) Type of infection/colonization:
a) Infection; this is usually observed with some signs of illness or
lesions -- maybe isolation of the organism from internal issues;
b) Colonization; this is represented by the ability to recover the
living organism from an individual with no clinical signs, i.e., no
harm done.
The papers [1 through 3] seem to be describing the direct route of
colonization, "occupational non-harmful colonization." Less than 1
percent had "infection" described. Evidence of "occupational
colonization" cannot be easily construed as major public health threat.
Note that very few cases of the farm (ST 398) types have been found in
non-farm related human illness
--
Scott Hurd
Iowa State University
VDPAM, VMRI Bld 4
[see also:
Antibiotic resistance & agricultural uses - USA 20100216.0552
2000
----
Antibiotic resistance & agricultural uses - USA (02) 20000511.0718
Antibiotic resistance & agricultural uses - USA 20000429.0649
Antibiotic resistance, surveillance - Europe 20000103.0003
1998
----
Antibiotic resistance trends - Europe 19990204.0170
Antibiotic resistance: Internet surveillance (02) 19981219.2407
Antibiotic resistance: Internet surveillance 19981216.2373
Antibiotic resistance, livestock - USA 19980807.1542
Antibiotic resistance, livestock - USA 19980805.1509]]
.....................jw/mhj/ejp/jw
*##########################################################*
************************************************************
ProMED-mail makes every effort to verify the reports that
are posted, but the accuracy and completeness of the
information, and of any statements or opinions based
thereon, are not guaranteed. The reader assumes all risks in
using information posted or archived by ProMED-mail. ISID
and its associated service providers shall not be held
responsible for errors or omissions or held liable for any
damages incurred as a result of use or reliance upon posted
or archived material.
************************************************************
Donate to ProMED-mail. Details available at:
************************************************************
Visit ProMED-mail's web site at.
Send all items for posting to: promed@promedmail.org
(NOT to an individual moderator). If you do not give your
full name and affiliation, it may not be posted. Send
commands to subscribe/unsubscribe, get archives, help,
etc. to: majordomo@promedmail.org. For assistance from a
human being send mail to: owner-promed@promedmail.org.
############################################################
############################################################
ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases
******
[1]
Date: June 2008
Source: Clinical Microbiology and Infection [edited]
MRSA in livestock animals -- an epidemic waiting to happen?
-----------------------------------------------------------
M. Wulf & A. Voss, Volume 14, Issue 6, Date: June 2008, Pages: 519-521
Abstract:
---------
Screening of pig farmers and pigs in The Netherlands has revealed that
more than 20 percent of pig farmers and 39 percent of slaughterhouse
pigs are positive for an unusual strain of methicillin-resistant
_Staphylococcus aureus_ (MRSA) belonging to sequence type (ST) 398. It
is now clear that the emergence of ST398 is not just a Dutch problem,
with human infections being described in several European countries,
Canada and Singapore. Furthermore, some human isolates have now
acquired the genes encoding Panton-Valentine leukocidin. Livestock may
become an important source of community-acquired MRSA. A concerted
effort on the part of clinicians, infection control practitioners and
veterinarians will be required to prevent further spread of this novel
strain of MRSA.
[See full text at:
(registration required)]
--
Communicated by:
Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
******
[2]
Date: July 2009
Source: EID [edited]
Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus ST398 in Swine Farm
Personnel, Belgium.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Oliver Dennis et al, EID Volume 15, Number 7-July 2009
Abstract:
---------
We assessed methicillin-resistant _Staphylococcus aureus_ (MRSA) in
persons on 49 swine farms in Belgium. Surveys showed that 48 (37.8
percent) persons carried MRSA ST398 and 1 (0.8 percent) had concurrent
skin infection. Risk factors for carriage were MRSA carriage by pigs,
regular contact with pigs and companion animals, and use of protective
clothing.
[snip...]
Conclusions:
------------
Human carriage of MRSA was associated with swine colonization with
MRSA. Prevalence rate (38 percent) was higher than that for
hospitalized patients or nursing home residents in Belgium
(
farmers belonged to closely related spa types corresponding to ST398,
which are unrelated to hospital- and community-acquired strains but
identical to strains from humans in contact with pigs in other
European countries (1,2,10).
Despite the high prevalence of nasal MRSA, active MRSA skin infection
was detected infrequently (less than 1 percent), within the range
described in recent US-based studies (11). In a hospital in the
Netherlands, a lower attack rate was found for MRSA ST398 than for
other MRSA strains (12). However, invasive infections caused by MRSA
ST398 have been reported, suggesting that this genotype is pathogenic
for humans (2). In our study, MRSA strains did not harbor exotoxin.
Two MRSA genotypes were predominant. For 70 percent of farms with
multiple MRSA carriers, all strains belonged to the same genotype,
suggesting transmission within the farm. Although these strains have
been shown to not spread easily in hospitals (12), outbreaks of MRSA
ST398 in a residential care facility and a hospital probably
originated from health care workers living on pig farms (13,14). In
contrast with MRSA strains, MSSA [methicillin-susceptible]
_Staphylococcus aureus_ isolates in our study showed diverse genotypes
that frequently colonize human populations (4). MSSA isolates from 3
farmers belonged to the ST398 genotype, which is infrequently reported
in humans except in pig farmers with contact with pigs (4).
Risk factors for MRSA ST398 carriage included regular contact with
pigs but also with horses and dogs (10), suggesting that different
animals could be MRSA ST398 reservoirs or vectors, at least on pig
farms. Protective measures did not seem to reduce the risk of becoming
colonized with MRSA; this lack of effectiveness has previously been
observed for veterinarians (15). This apparent lack of protection
should be further investigated to determine routes of transmission
other than direct contact with pigs, including airborne transmission
and contact with contaminated surfaces and companion animals.
--
Communicated by:
Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
******
[3]
Date: 24 Feb 2010
Source: Veterinary Microbiology [edited]
Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus in horses and horse
personnel: An investigation of several outbreaks.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
E. van Duijkeren et al, Veterinary Microbiology Volume 141, Issues
1-2, 24 February 2010, Pages 96-102
Abstract:
---------
At the Veterinary Microbiological Diagnostic Center, the Netherlands,
the percentage of methicillin-resistant _Staphylococcus aureus_ (MRSA)
isolates found in equine clinical samples increased from 0 percent in
2002 to 37 percent in 2008. MRSA of spa-type t064, belonging to MLST
ST8 and spa-types t011 and t2123, both belonging to the
livestock-associated MLST ST398, predominated.
During an outbreak of post-surgical MRSA infections in horses at a
veterinary teaching hospital in 2006/2007, MRSA isolates of spa-type
t2123 were cultured from 7 horses and 4/61 personnel which indicated
zoonotic transmission. After intervention the outbreak stopped.
However, another outbreak occurred in 2008, where 17 equine MRSA
isolates of spa-type t011 (n = 12), t2123 (n = 4), and t064 (n = 1)
were found. This time, 16/170 personnel were positive for MRSA with
spa-type t011 (n = 11) and t2123 (n = 5). Personnel in close contact
with horses were more often MRSA-positive (15/106) than those without
(1/64).
Screening of horses upon admission showed that 9.3 percent were
MRSA-positive predominantly with spa-type t011. Weekly cross-sectional
sampling of all hospitalized horses for 5 weeks showed that 42 percent
of the horses were MRSA-positive at least once, again predominantly
with spa-type t011, which suggests that nosocomial transmission took
place. A total of 53 percent of the environmental samples were
MRSA-positive, including samples from students' and staff members'
rooms, and all were spa-type t011. This indicates that humans
contribute to spreading the organism. Culturing of samples employing
high-salt pre-enrichment performed better than a comparable method
without pre-enrichment.
Our results show that nosocomial transmission occurs in equine clinics
and suggests that personnel play a role in the transmission.
--
Communicated by:
Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
[Our thanks to Terry for finding these and other recent articles.
Obviously this is a [question of what is suitable for one situation
might be unsuitable for another], as far as different types of
antibiotics go or stay. - Mod.MHJ]
******
[4]
Date: 18 Feb 2010
From: Hurd, H. S [VDPAM]
RE: Antibiotic resistance & agricultural uses - USA (02)
--------------------------------------------------------
When considering MRSA it is important to categorize the data being
discussed on 2 axes: 1) route of human exposure; and 2) type of
infection/colonization. Confusing these items will lead to a
misrepresentation of the risk.
1) Route can include:
a) Direct Exposure to animals; e.g., What also may be called
"occupational exposure";
b) Foodborne; This is the classic route taken by pathogens such as
Salmonella or Campylobacter -- this route is very rare for MRSA;
c) Fomite contact; if MRSA is on the meat brought home, it may get
implanted into the human. According to the CDC, this is not a likely
route.
2) Type of infection/colonization:
a) Infection; this is usually observed with some signs of illness or
lesions -- maybe isolation of the organism from internal issues;
b) Colonization; this is represented by the ability to recover the
living organism from an individual with no clinical signs, i.e., no
harm done.
The papers [1 through 3] seem to be describing the direct route of
colonization, "occupational non-harmful colonization." Less than 1
percent had "infection" described. Evidence of "occupational
colonization" cannot be easily construed as major public health threat.
Note that very few cases of the farm (ST 398) types have been found in
non-farm related human illness
--
Scott Hurd
Iowa State University
VDPAM, VMRI Bld 4
[see also:
Antibiotic resistance & agricultural uses - USA 20100216.0552
2000
----
Antibiotic resistance & agricultural uses - USA (02) 20000511.0718
Antibiotic resistance & agricultural uses - USA 20000429.0649
Antibiotic resistance, surveillance - Europe 20000103.0003
1998
----
Antibiotic resistance trends - Europe 19990204.0170
Antibiotic resistance: Internet surveillance (02) 19981219.2407
Antibiotic resistance: Internet surveillance 19981216.2373
Antibiotic resistance, livestock - USA 19980807.1542
Antibiotic resistance, livestock - USA 19980805.1509]]
.....................jw/mhj/ejp/jw
*##########################################################*
************************************************************
ProMED-mail makes every effort to verify the reports that
are posted, but the accuracy and completeness of the
information, and of any statements or opinions based
thereon, are not guaranteed. The reader assumes all risks in
using information posted or archived by ProMED-mail. ISID
and its associated service providers shall not be held
responsible for errors or omissions or held liable for any
damages incurred as a result of use or reliance upon posted
or archived material.
************************************************************
Donate to ProMED-mail. Details available at:
************************************************************
Visit ProMED-mail's web site at
Send all items for posting to: promed@promedmail.org
(NOT to an individual moderator). If you do not give your
full name and affiliation, it may not be posted. Send
commands to subscribe/unsubscribe, get archives, help,
etc. to: majordomo@promedmail.org. For assistance from a
human being send mail to: owner-promed@promedmail.org.
############################################################
############################################################
Wednesday, February 17, 2010
Antibiotics in Livestock Production cause Antibiotic Resistance in Humans
Wonder why we are all coming down with zootonic diseases? Click on title above for new report
Q Fever Out-Break / UPDATE
Q FEVER - NETHERLANDS (13): HUMAN, ANIMAL
*****************************************
A ProMED-mail post
ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases
[1] Ovine, caprine
[2] Human
******
[1] Ovine, caprine
Date: Tue 16 Feb 2010
Source: Agrarisch Dagblad [in Dutch, trans. Mod.AS, edited]
2nd dairy sheep plant with Q fever
----------------------------------
The Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority (VWA) announced that a
dairy sheep farm in Stolwijk, South Holland, has been declared Q-fever
infected. It is the 2nd dairy sheep plant declared infected in the
Netherlands [since 1 Oct 2009]. In January [2010], a dairy sheep farm
in Kraggenburg was found infected.
In addition, another dairy goat farm in Haren, North Brabant, has now
been declared infected. The current total number of Q-fever infected
farms found in the Netherlands [since 1 Oct 2009], is 73 [of which 71
are dairy goat farms].
--
Communicated by:
Sabine Zentis
Castleview Pedigree English Longhorns
Gut Laach
52385 Nideggen
Germany
******
[2] Human
Date: Thu 11 Feb 2010
Source: AgriHolland [in Dutch, trans. & summ. Mod.AS, edited]
11 new Q fever patients so far in 2010
--------------------------------------
According to the Dutch National Institute for Public Health and the
Environment (RIVM), 136 new human cases of Q fever have been reported
in the country during the current year [2010]. In 11 of the patients,
the onset of disease took place during 2010 and it is assumed that
they had been infected within the previous weeks. The dates of onset
of disease in the other patients are not known, but are considered to
have taken place during 2009 or even earlier. Many people report their
health complaints to their family doctors only now, following the
disease becoming a news item [eventually leading to serological
confirmation. The incubation period for acute Q fever in humans varies
from 2 to 48 days; the typical incubation period is approximately 2 to
3 weeks. Chronic Q fever can occur from months to years after
infection. - Mod.AS]
--
Communicated by:
ProMED-mail
[An epidemic curve graph, showing the number of reported Dutch Q fever
patients by week of onset for the period 1 Jan 2007-10 Feb 2010, is
available at
.
The cases are presented according to the relevant Community Health
Services (GGD): dark green - "Hart voor Brabant" (NE Brabant); medium
green - SE Brabant; light green - South Limburg; gray - others. The
annual total numbers - 2007: N=194, 2008: N=980, 2009: N=2267, 2010:
N=11.
According to a recent literature search, 53 lab-confirmed outbreaks of
Q fever in humans have been published during the years 1981-2007. The
following 6 countries experienced the largest number of confirmed
outbreaks: Germany (9), France (6), Australia (5), Canada (5), UK (5),
USA (5). The remaining 18 outbreaks were reported from various parts
of the globe. In 26 of the 53 outbreaks, sheep were regarded as source
of infection; goats in 6. Among the other animal sources, cats were
suspected in 3 smaller outbreaks. Larger outbreaks were reported from
East European countries, but lab confirmation was not available.
_C. burnetii_ can infect many species of domestic animals and
wildlife; in many species, the infection appears to be asymptomatic.
Its reservoirs may be only partially known. Sheep, goats, and cattle
seem to be the most common domesticat animal reservoirs. Wild rodents
may be important reservoirs in some areas, and cats -- particularly
following parturition -- are suspected in urban outbreaks. _C.
burnetii_ has also been isolated from dogs, rabbits, horses, pigs,
camels, buffalo, deer, pigeons, swallows, parrots, crows, geese, and
other mammals and birds. Antibodies have been found in coyotes,
raccoons, opossums, badgers, jackrabbits, black bears, musk oxen and
other species. There are also reports of _C. burnetii_ in fish and
snakes. - Mod.AS]
[Maps of the Netherlands are available at
and
. - Sr.Tech.Ed.MJ]
[see also:
Q fever - Netherlands (12): 3 new outbreaks 20100213.0513
Q fever - Netherlands (11): culling dispute 20100206.0407
Q fever - Netherlands (10): international response 20100204.0380
Q fever - Netherlands (09): zoo-sanitary measures 20100128.0307
Q fever - Netherlands (08): sheep, update 20100125.0278
Q fever - Netherlands (07): update 20100115.0182
Q fever - Netherlands (06): OIE 20100115.0181
Q fever - Netherlands (05): investigation committee 20100112.0144
Q fever - Netherlands (04): culling 20100111.0119
Q fever - Netherlands (03): update 20100107.0079
Q fever - Netherlands (02): update 20100105.0047
Q fever - Netherlands: monitoring 20100103.0028
2009
----
Q fever - Netherlands (19): update 20091229.4375
Q fever - Netherlands (18): update 20091225.4334
Q fever - Netherlands (17): pathogenicity, RFI 20091222.4312
Q fever - Netherlands (16): pathogenicity, RFI 20091222.4304
Q fever - Netherlands (15): update 20091219.4286
Q fever - Netherlands (14): update 20091217.4271
Q fever, animals - Belgium: RFI 20091213.4234
Q fever - Netherlands (13): control measures 20091209.4198
Q fever - Netherlands (12): update 20091207.4173
Q fever - Netherlands (11): public health 20091113.3930
Q fever - Netherlands (10): update 20091107.3861
Q fever - Netherlands (09): predictions 20091004.3452
Q fever - Netherlands (08): update, monitoring & animal vaccination
20090927.3380
Q fever - Netherlands (07) 20090908.3169
Q fever - Netherlands (06) 20090814.2889
Q fever - Netherlands (05) 20090629.2355
Q fever - Netherlands (04): fatalities 20090626.2330
Q Fever - Netherlands (03): update, animal vaccination 20090510.1744
Q Fever - Netherlands (02): (NB) 20090508.1721
Q fever, caprine - Netherlands: (LI) 20090331.1230
Q fever - Netherlands: sheep & goat vaccination 20090228.0841
2008
----
Q fever - Netherlands (04): sheep & goat vaccination 20081023.3352
Q fever - Netherlands (03): (NBR, GEL) 20080802.2367
Q fever - Netherlands (02): (NBR) 20080728.2306
Q fever - Netherlands: (NBR) 20080725.2267
2007
----
Q fever - Netherlands (Noord-Brabant, Gelderland) 20070809.2592]
.........................................arn/mj/jw
*##########################################################*
************************************************************
ProMED-mail makes every effort to verify the reports that
are posted, but the accuracy and completeness of the
information, and of any statements or opinions based
thereon, are not guaranteed. The reader assumes all risks in
using information posted or archived by ProMED-mail. ISID
and its associated service providers shall not be held
responsible for errors or omissions or held liable for any
damages incurred as a result of use or reliance upon posted
or archived material.
************************************************************
Donate to ProMED-mail. Details available at:
************************************************************
Visit ProMED-mail's web site at.
Send all items for posting to: promed@promedmail.org
(NOT to an individual moderator). If you do not give your
full name and affiliation, it may not be posted. Send
commands to subscribe/unsubscribe, get archives, help,
etc. to: majordomo@promedmail.org. For assistance from a
human being send mail to: owner-promed@promedmail.org.
############################################################
############################################################
*****************************************
A ProMED-mail post
ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases
[1] Ovine, caprine
[2] Human
******
[1] Ovine, caprine
Date: Tue 16 Feb 2010
Source: Agrarisch Dagblad [in Dutch, trans. Mod.AS, edited]
2nd dairy sheep plant with Q fever
----------------------------------
The Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority (VWA) announced that a
dairy sheep farm in Stolwijk, South Holland, has been declared Q-fever
infected. It is the 2nd dairy sheep plant declared infected in the
Netherlands [since 1 Oct 2009]. In January [2010], a dairy sheep farm
in Kraggenburg was found infected.
In addition, another dairy goat farm in Haren, North Brabant, has now
been declared infected. The current total number of Q-fever infected
farms found in the Netherlands [since 1 Oct 2009], is 73 [of which 71
are dairy goat farms].
--
Communicated by:
Sabine Zentis
Castleview Pedigree English Longhorns
Gut Laach
52385 Nideggen
Germany
******
[2] Human
Date: Thu 11 Feb 2010
Source: AgriHolland [in Dutch, trans. & summ. Mod.AS, edited]
11 new Q fever patients so far in 2010
--------------------------------------
According to the Dutch National Institute for Public Health and the
Environment (RIVM), 136 new human cases of Q fever have been reported
in the country during the current year [2010]. In 11 of the patients,
the onset of disease took place during 2010 and it is assumed that
they had been infected within the previous weeks. The dates of onset
of disease in the other patients are not known, but are considered to
have taken place during 2009 or even earlier. Many people report their
health complaints to their family doctors only now, following the
disease becoming a news item [eventually leading to serological
confirmation. The incubation period for acute Q fever in humans varies
from 2 to 48 days; the typical incubation period is approximately 2 to
3 weeks. Chronic Q fever can occur from months to years after
infection. - Mod.AS]
--
Communicated by:
ProMED-mail
[An epidemic curve graph, showing the number of reported Dutch Q fever
patients by week of onset for the period 1 Jan 2007-10 Feb 2010, is
available at
The cases are presented according to the relevant Community Health
Services (GGD): dark green - "Hart voor Brabant" (NE Brabant); medium
green - SE Brabant; light green - South Limburg; gray - others. The
annual total numbers - 2007: N=194, 2008: N=980, 2009: N=2267, 2010:
N=11.
According to a recent literature search, 53 lab-confirmed outbreaks of
Q fever in humans have been published during the years 1981-2007. The
following 6 countries experienced the largest number of confirmed
outbreaks: Germany (9), France (6), Australia (5), Canada (5), UK (5),
USA (5). The remaining 18 outbreaks were reported from various parts
of the globe. In 26 of the 53 outbreaks, sheep were regarded as source
of infection; goats in 6. Among the other animal sources, cats were
suspected in 3 smaller outbreaks. Larger outbreaks were reported from
East European countries, but lab confirmation was not available.
_C. burnetii_ can infect many species of domestic animals and
wildlife; in many species, the infection appears to be asymptomatic.
Its reservoirs may be only partially known. Sheep, goats, and cattle
seem to be the most common domesticat animal reservoirs. Wild rodents
may be important reservoirs in some areas, and cats -- particularly
following parturition -- are suspected in urban outbreaks. _C.
burnetii_ has also been isolated from dogs, rabbits, horses, pigs,
camels, buffalo, deer, pigeons, swallows, parrots, crows, geese, and
other mammals and birds. Antibodies have been found in coyotes,
raccoons, opossums, badgers, jackrabbits, black bears, musk oxen and
other species. There are also reports of _C. burnetii_ in fish and
snakes. - Mod.AS]
[Maps of the Netherlands are available at
[see also:
Q fever - Netherlands (12): 3 new outbreaks 20100213.0513
Q fever - Netherlands (11): culling dispute 20100206.0407
Q fever - Netherlands (10): international response 20100204.0380
Q fever - Netherlands (09): zoo-sanitary measures 20100128.0307
Q fever - Netherlands (08): sheep, update 20100125.0278
Q fever - Netherlands (07): update 20100115.0182
Q fever - Netherlands (06): OIE 20100115.0181
Q fever - Netherlands (05): investigation committee 20100112.0144
Q fever - Netherlands (04): culling 20100111.0119
Q fever - Netherlands (03): update 20100107.0079
Q fever - Netherlands (02): update 20100105.0047
Q fever - Netherlands: monitoring 20100103.0028
2009
----
Q fever - Netherlands (19): update 20091229.4375
Q fever - Netherlands (18): update 20091225.4334
Q fever - Netherlands (17): pathogenicity, RFI 20091222.4312
Q fever - Netherlands (16): pathogenicity, RFI 20091222.4304
Q fever - Netherlands (15): update 20091219.4286
Q fever - Netherlands (14): update 20091217.4271
Q fever, animals - Belgium: RFI 20091213.4234
Q fever - Netherlands (13): control measures 20091209.4198
Q fever - Netherlands (12): update 20091207.4173
Q fever - Netherlands (11): public health 20091113.3930
Q fever - Netherlands (10): update 20091107.3861
Q fever - Netherlands (09): predictions 20091004.3452
Q fever - Netherlands (08): update, monitoring & animal vaccination
20090927.3380
Q fever - Netherlands (07) 20090908.3169
Q fever - Netherlands (06) 20090814.2889
Q fever - Netherlands (05) 20090629.2355
Q fever - Netherlands (04): fatalities 20090626.2330
Q Fever - Netherlands (03): update, animal vaccination 20090510.1744
Q Fever - Netherlands (02): (NB) 20090508.1721
Q fever, caprine - Netherlands: (LI) 20090331.1230
Q fever - Netherlands: sheep & goat vaccination 20090228.0841
2008
----
Q fever - Netherlands (04): sheep & goat vaccination 20081023.3352
Q fever - Netherlands (03): (NBR, GEL) 20080802.2367
Q fever - Netherlands (02): (NBR) 20080728.2306
Q fever - Netherlands: (NBR) 20080725.2267
2007
----
Q fever - Netherlands (Noord-Brabant, Gelderland) 20070809.2592]
.........................................arn/mj/jw
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Thursday, February 11, 2010
CJD in USA
Four (4) Die of CJD in NY;
http://www.rense.com/general58/cluster.htm
Two in Michigan Die of CJD;
http://www.prwatch.org/node/1161
Five (5) CJD Deaths in NJ;
http://www.organicconsumers.org/madcow/nj42404.cfm
During 1979 through 2006, an estimated 6,917 deaths with CJD as a cause of death were reported in the United States, an annual average of approximately 247 deaths (range 172-304 deaths); Click on title above to see report;
http://memory.ucsf.edu/cjd/news/human-prion-diseases-in-the-United-States
http://www.rense.com/general58/cluster.htm
Two in Michigan Die of CJD;
http://www.prwatch.org/node/1161
Five (5) CJD Deaths in NJ;
http://www.organicconsumers.org/madcow/nj42404.cfm
During 1979 through 2006, an estimated 6,917 deaths with CJD as a cause of death were reported in the United States, an annual average of approximately 247 deaths (range 172-304 deaths); Click on title above to see report;
http://memory.ucsf.edu/cjd/news/human-prion-diseases-in-the-United-States
Prion Disease School
There are many forms of prion diseases, CJD vCJD are only a few. One thing they have in common is that the causes are unknown, only suspected.
CJD has been around for a long time. vCJD is a more recent "mutation" that effects younger folk.
The funny thing with malformed, malfunctioning prions is that they change slightly with each new host they effect. From all indications, not only do they mutate differently from species to species, but also from individuals and person to person too, depending on a number of factors.
The first CJD malformed prion was discovered in a scrapie sheep.
Click on title above to go to the prion disease center where you can learn more about it and watch an hour long vid
http://www.neuroprion.org/en/DVD-2007-medium.html
CJD has been around for a long time. vCJD is a more recent "mutation" that effects younger folk.
The funny thing with malformed, malfunctioning prions is that they change slightly with each new host they effect. From all indications, not only do they mutate differently from species to species, but also from individuals and person to person too, depending on a number of factors.
The first CJD malformed prion was discovered in a scrapie sheep.
Click on title above to go to the prion disease center where you can learn more about it and watch an hour long vid
http://www.neuroprion.org/en/DVD-2007-medium.html
Wednesday, February 10, 2010
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